Wuzak
19th December 2008, 04:19
Was watching a DVD about the B-17 last night. The DVD contained a Boeing documentary about the development of the B-17, as well as a war time propoganda film of the Schweinfurt raid (the first one).
One of the stats that the film mentioned was that the B-17s dropped over 400 tons of bombs, in which were included 80 direct hits.
So, I picked up Donald L Miller's Masters of the Air, to see what he had to say about the mission. According to Miller the B-17s dropped 1000lb bombs on Schweinfurt, which represented about 40 tons of bombs on target, or about 10% of the bombs that were dropped.
The Regensburg-Schweinfurt mission taught the USAAF some lessons about the air war over Germany, even if it was only the crews that learned them...
From Masters of the Air:
William H. Wheeler, a pilot with the 91st Bomb Group remarked forty years later: “The Air Force had it proved to them that the idea of sending B-17s unescoreted on a deep penetration just wasn’t valid”.
Whilst the 8th rebuilt after the double-mission, one squadron of B-17s joined the RAF in 8 night raids, in which the bomber losses were relatively light. Eaker, head of the 8th AF, was testing the water in case the order came to abandon daylight bombing. But General Arnold still supported the daylight bombing campaign, and so it continued.
Early in October 1943 Eaker set out a series of raids in what was to become known as Black Week. The final raid during that week was a second run to Schweinfurt. This became known as Black Thursday. Of the 229 bombers sent on the mission, only 33 returned without damage. 60 were lost. 642 men bomber crew died.
Miller:
Black Thursday should have killed the idea of the self defending bomber, but it did not. Eaker clung stubbornly to it. “We must continue the battle with unrelenting fury,” he cabled Arnold the day after the Schweinfurt raid. “This we shall do.”
The weather of the winter of 1943/1944 caused much disruption to the daylight offensive. By the time the weather improved Eaker was gone, replaced by Spaatz and Doolittle, and fighter escorts now included P-38s (which had been used in North Africa during Torch and beyond) and P-51s.
It has to be said that Eaker was against the original Schweinfurt mission - not because of the potential losses, but because he didn't think the 8th were quite ready for such deep penetration raids, but he had to bow to his superiors.
So the idea of the self defending bomber died a unecessarily long death, costing many lives in the process. This came out from an idea from the mid '30s that the bomber would always get through. And that it was impossible to build high performance fighters with the range to protect the bombers.
It also went against, in part, the ideas of Billy Mitchell, whose belief in air power the likes of Arnold, Spaatz and Eaker developed. Mitchell's idea of bombardment was that first the enemy air force must be destroyed, and that the proportion of fighters to bombers would be 60/40.
These ideas were also cemented by the performance of the XB and YB-17s, which outperfomed the USAAC's own fighters. A situation which was very short lived.
So, stubbornly sticking to one's ideas may be counterproductive.
Another with fixed ideas was Bomber Harris..........
One of the stats that the film mentioned was that the B-17s dropped over 400 tons of bombs, in which were included 80 direct hits.
So, I picked up Donald L Miller's Masters of the Air, to see what he had to say about the mission. According to Miller the B-17s dropped 1000lb bombs on Schweinfurt, which represented about 40 tons of bombs on target, or about 10% of the bombs that were dropped.
The Regensburg-Schweinfurt mission taught the USAAF some lessons about the air war over Germany, even if it was only the crews that learned them...
From Masters of the Air:
William H. Wheeler, a pilot with the 91st Bomb Group remarked forty years later: “The Air Force had it proved to them that the idea of sending B-17s unescoreted on a deep penetration just wasn’t valid”.
Whilst the 8th rebuilt after the double-mission, one squadron of B-17s joined the RAF in 8 night raids, in which the bomber losses were relatively light. Eaker, head of the 8th AF, was testing the water in case the order came to abandon daylight bombing. But General Arnold still supported the daylight bombing campaign, and so it continued.
Early in October 1943 Eaker set out a series of raids in what was to become known as Black Week. The final raid during that week was a second run to Schweinfurt. This became known as Black Thursday. Of the 229 bombers sent on the mission, only 33 returned without damage. 60 were lost. 642 men bomber crew died.
Miller:
Black Thursday should have killed the idea of the self defending bomber, but it did not. Eaker clung stubbornly to it. “We must continue the battle with unrelenting fury,” he cabled Arnold the day after the Schweinfurt raid. “This we shall do.”
The weather of the winter of 1943/1944 caused much disruption to the daylight offensive. By the time the weather improved Eaker was gone, replaced by Spaatz and Doolittle, and fighter escorts now included P-38s (which had been used in North Africa during Torch and beyond) and P-51s.
It has to be said that Eaker was against the original Schweinfurt mission - not because of the potential losses, but because he didn't think the 8th were quite ready for such deep penetration raids, but he had to bow to his superiors.
So the idea of the self defending bomber died a unecessarily long death, costing many lives in the process. This came out from an idea from the mid '30s that the bomber would always get through. And that it was impossible to build high performance fighters with the range to protect the bombers.
It also went against, in part, the ideas of Billy Mitchell, whose belief in air power the likes of Arnold, Spaatz and Eaker developed. Mitchell's idea of bombardment was that first the enemy air force must be destroyed, and that the proportion of fighters to bombers would be 60/40.
These ideas were also cemented by the performance of the XB and YB-17s, which outperfomed the USAAC's own fighters. A situation which was very short lived.
So, stubbornly sticking to one's ideas may be counterproductive.
Another with fixed ideas was Bomber Harris..........