3dr waves target?

[b-1]

the attack on pearl harb was going to be a 3 wave attack. the japans lanched 2 but not the third from fear of the american carriers. i have been wondering if the attack was going to be on the oilfields and what ever else the missed with the other waves.

[R Leonard]

There was never a specifically designated third strike planned for the Pearl Harbor attack. The only mention of a possible third attack on Pearl Harbor that appears in the Operations Order is:

"Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts. "

This would lead one to believe that any third attack would be anti-shipping. And, unlike as for waves one and two, there is no task listing in the order for the various air units in the event of a third attack.

Nowhere in the Operations Order is there any reference whatsoever to oil/fuel facilities or to fleet maintenance facilities. The subject does not even come up.

Poor Nagumo is constantly berated for this failure to strike fuel and maintenance facilities; and all sorts of dire consequences to USN operations are predicted if only Nagumo had . . .

Everyone seems to forget that this is the Japanese Navy, an organization not particularly known for departing from the written order.

As for a set back to USN operations, remember that Pearl Harbor as the main base for the Pacific Fleet had only been in operation for about 20 months. Much of what was to later become the massive infrastructure there had not been built. The fuel storage facilities at PH were not the, yet to be completed, permanent facilities at Red Hill, and, as such, did not have all that much capacity. Further, a not inconsiderable quantity of the available bunker fuel at PH had been loaded on the Lexington, Enterprise, their escorts, and their logistical trains for their reinforcement missions to Midway and Wake, so the storage facilities were not at full capacity, anyway.

Loss of repair facilities would not mean much, either, considering that major repairs were done at the west coast navy yards, anyway, not at Pearl Harbor. There was A drydock at Pearl Harbor, how many do you think were at Mare Island, Terminal Island, or Puget Sound? Why do you think they had to move a floating drydock to Pearl Harbor . . . because there wasn't enough maintenance capacity.

Loss of fuel reserves? That's what oilers were for. Does anyone really believe that in 1941/1942 the US could not conjure up replacement stocks? And commit both naval and civilian oilers to the replenishment effort? How long do you think a determined effort to do so would take? Sure, the loss would be unfortunate, but it could be replaced. I’ll give you an idea. In 1941, the US was a net EXPORTER of oil, not an IMPORTER as today. Further, the Pacific Fleet had some 10 fleet oilers available and another 22 civilian tankers under contract. Major fuel loading facilities were located on the west coast. Replacement of lost fuel would be relatively easy.

Further, this third strike on PH theory gives the striking power of the Japanese entirely too much credit. Fuel facilities aside, what about maintenance facilities? The poured, reinforced, concrete nature of dry dock construction would mitigate against the possible destruction of the facility, even if exposed to the No 80 805 Kg (1774 lbs) bomb or a Type 98 #25 242 Kg (533 lbs) bomb, both of which could penetrate 400 mm of concrete. Of course you can always protest that they could have dropped some of their modified 14in AP rounds, but actually, that type of bomb would been even worse for the job, as to be truly effective it needs a void, that is a relatively empty space, in which to explode in order to magnify the effect of it’s somewhat small explosive charge . . . a battleship’s magazine is just such a perfect place.

Imagine for a moment dropping, say, 5 Type 98s or even, 5 No 80s around the Drydock #1 area. How long do you suppose it would take the USN to craft new forms and fashion the reinforcing rods and pour new concrete? Over night? Certainly not, but within three weeks? Why not? They had everything there they needed to do the job. . . after all by December 1941, PH was in a constant state of construction.

I would also point out that Floating Drydock #2 (YFD-2), in which USS Shaw had it’s bow blown off by a one of the three Japanese bomb which struck that ship, in addition to at least two bomb hits on the drydock itself (which caused it to sink), was back in service by the end of April 1942.

About the only way to take out the Pearl Harbor Drydock #1 in December 1941 was a direct hit, by a bomb, or, better, a torpedo on the flood gates. As any dive bomber pilot or torpedo plane pilot can tell you, that is a very small target and, probably, without all the luck that one could muster, impossible to hit. And again, how long do you think it would take to effect repairs?

And you have to think about just how many of these specialized bombs was the Kido Butai going to be willing to haul around when as far as the IJN was concerned the targets were ships, battleships, carriers, cruisers, in that order. The plain simple truth is that the strike on Pearl Harbor was planned with the typical, ubiquitous, Japanese disregard for logistics. The object, in which they actually failed, was to kill the fighting power of the Pacific Fleet. There was no thought to striking the fleet service facilities, fuel or maintenance, whatsoever.

A lot of what folks tend to write on this subject shows ( a ) a disregard of the information available to the Japanese, ( b ) an unfortunate lack of knowledge on how places like Pearl Harbor are laid out and operate, and ( c ) the, now so obvious, typical Japanese disregard for the strategic logisitical target over the strategic combat target. These are critical issues. For starts, Pearl Harbor maintenance shops and facilities were not all congregated in one place, but rather disbursed though the base (as they are to this day). This was not particularly due to any diligence in protecting facilities from a massive strike by spreading them out, but simply evolution of the development of the installation. Further, like most naval bases, even today, if you don’t know where you are going, you need to read carefully the signs on buildings announcing this activity or that (and be able to accurately translate the acronym mish-mash the Navy tends to use). Not really do-able from the air and what few Japanese intelligence types were in the islands tended to be content to count ships and conduct random timings of patrol plane activities. They did not wander around the base making note of this shop or the other. And just the evidence of the attack operations order itself displays the lack of interest in these types of strategic logistical targets.

Bottom line is the Japanese did not have the capability, capacity, nor, and more importantly, any interest, to successfully strike these facilities, so speculation as to the possible outcome of their doing so is somewhat idle.

Most of the question of their failure to do so comes from the US side and not the Japanese side, sort of a “I wonder why they didn’t . . . ?” This is usually followed with “We would have tried to level the place.” Yes, yes, sure you would, with just a couple of hundred carrier planes in your strike force, uh huh, right." But it is indicative of the American strike operational mentality to look to the fleet service facilities as targets not to be wasted . . . Certainly by the end of the war, with massive AAF bombing forces available and carrier task forces that could throw 1100 sorties at a single target, Japanese shore installations were sorely attacked, but they were never totally taken out . . . kind of gives you an idea of the difficulties.

Lastly, you might want to consider losses incurred by the Japanese. Their first wave got off fairly lightly, but their second wave was not so lucky, especially in terms of losses to strike aircraft. A third wave would have gotten off no better than the second, and, I would guess, even worse.

I think Nagumo would have been able to figure that out for himself, and since a third strike was left somewhat optional, that is why he opted out. I believe that if folks were to look into the logistical capabilities of the USN they would find that the "Third Strike" failure as a potential crippler of US capabilities is a red herring.

Rich

[PMN1]

Bloody good reply there and have you been on the warships 1 board as this came up in the past 2-3 months with a poster thinking there could be accurate targetting of the storage tamks and dry dock gates.......it got a bit heated.....

Its also been suggested that,the talk of a third wave has been the result of the Japanese telling the US interrogators what they wanted to hear.

http://p216.ezboard.com/fwarships1discussionboardsfrm1.showMessage?topicID =7497.topic&index=15

[Dogwalker]

For a comparison, think at the quantity of explosive the Axis dropped on Malta's facilities, without succeding in "levelling" them.

[R Leonard]

Malta . . . Exactly.

Went over to Warships and looked at the discussion. Lots of apples and oranges comparisons. Now you guys know my opinion on the matter; I thought the folks arguing that viewpoint more convincing than the "they coulda" side.

PMN1 - You're right, looks like they got a little contentious . . . fortunately that doesn't happen here. :D

Rich

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by R Leonard


PMN1 - You're right, looks like they got a little contentious . . . fortunately that doesn't happen here. :D

Rich


Perhaps if they had used a wooden aircraft (what is the Japanese for 'aircraft whose name should not be mentioned)?

:D

Also, not sure if the link is working properly as there were 5 pages.

http://p216.ezboard.com/fwarships1discussionboardsfrm1.showMessageRange?to picID=7497.topic&start=1&stop=20

[Groggy]

quote:Originally posted by PMN1

quote:Originally posted by R Leonard


PMN1 - You're right, looks like they got a little contentious . . . fortunately that doesn't happen here. :D

Rich


Perhaps if they had used a wooden aircraft (what is the Japanese for 'aircraft whose name should not be mentioned)?

:D

Also, not sure if the link is working properly as there were 5 pages.

http://p216.ezboard.com/fwarships1discussionboardsfrm1.showMessageRange?to picID=7497.topic&start=1&stop=20


Hi,
For the next couple of years where were the US carriers repaired?
How large was the US army garrison?
What if the third/fourth waves had been in support of an amphibious invasion?
Would this not have made a significant delay in the US response allowing Australia, New Zealand and India to come under direct sustained attack and occupation?

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by Groggy
[br


Hi,
For the next couple of years where were the US carriers repaired?
How large was the US army garrison?
What if the third/fourth waves had been in support of an amphibious invasion?
Would this not have made a significant delay in the US response allowing Australia, New Zealand and India to come under direct sustained attack and occupation?


[/quote]

Presumably the carriers could have gone to Puget Sound as with the Battleships (there was a discussion on the Battlecruisers page about the value of the repaired battleships that touched on this).

The US Army Garrison was quite large, certainy big enough to throw back the force that Japan could have sent given it was stretched to the limit logistically and troopwise by operations in Malaya, Phillipines etc - they couldn't do both, it was strike and occupy Hawaii (possibly) then run out of oil or strike and occupy SEA (again, there was a discussion on the Battlecruisers page that had this as its toppic).

Any 3rd/4th wave would have been seriously depleted by battle damage and facing a fully alerted AA stsyem plus quite few fighters that had escaped the first two attacks and the IJN carriers would have been near to the very end if not at the very end of muntions carriage (UNREP of solids was not something they had practiced).

Loss of Pearl would probably have made bases in Australia that much more important.

There have been a number of very very lengthy discussions on this on the Battlecruisers board, i'll see if i can dig them out though it suffered from a massive hack last year and a lot of posts were consigned to electronic oblivion.

[Groggy]

[/quote]


Many thanks PMN1

Presumably the carriers could have gone to Puget Sound as with the Battleships (there was a discussion on the Battlecruisers page about the value of the repaired battleships that touched on this).
Loss of Pearl would probably have made bases in Australia that much more important.
……………..

This would have made logistics more difficult and lengthened response time. Would this have focused the US on the Eastern Theatre?
…………………
The US Army Garrison was quite large, certainy big enough to throw back the force that Japan could have sent given it was stretched to the limit logistically and troopwise by operations in Malaya, Phillipines etc - they couldn't do both, it was strike and occupy Hawaii (possibly) then run out of oil or strike and occupy SEA (again, there was a discussion on the Battlecruisers page that had this as its toppic).
………………
I agree in general with you but could the Phillipines been left for a second phase?
………………..
Any 3rd/4th wave would have been seriously depleted by battle damage and facing a fully alerted AA stsyem plus quite few fighters that had escaped the first two attacks and the IJN carriers would have been near to the very end if not at the very end of muntions carriage (UNREP of solids was not something they had practiced).
………………..
Good points, but could the air bases have been over run at the start, they would have been the priority?

[PMN1]

Here's one of the posts about the PH attack.

http://p069.ezboard.com/falltheworldsbattlecruisersfrm1.showMessage?topicI D=1968.topic

[R Leonard]

quote:For the next couple of years where were the US carriers repaired?

Depended on the extent of damage. Presuming you mean just fleet carriers:

Saratoga was torpedoed on 11 January 1942 and after stopping at Pearl Harbor for the previously planned removal of her 8-inch guns, went to Bremerton for repairs between January and the end of May. Saratoga was torpedoed, again on 2 September and repairs were made at Pearl Harbor between 21 September and 10 November. Saratoga reported for overhaul in San Francisco between 9 December 1943 and 3 January 1944. Another overhaul at Bremerton lasted from 10 June 1944 to 15 September. Struck by 5 bombs on 21 February 1945, Saratoga returned to Bremerton after temporary repairs at Eniwetok. Arriving at Bremerton on 16 March Saratoga was under repair until 22 May and began training duties off Hawaii which lasted to the end of the war.

Yorktown (CV-5), of course, had some leaks patched and bulkheads shored up using Pearl’s Drydock #1, six months after the Pearl Harbor attack and just before her loss at Midway.

Let’s see, Lexington (CV-2) sank (NB: My father flew the last CAP over the sinking Lexington), Yorktown (CV-5) sank (NB: My father flew the last CAP over the abandoned Yorktown), Wasp (CV-7) sank, and Hornet (CV-8) sank.

Enterprise was damaged by 3 bombs hit and 4 near misses on 24 August 1942 and repaired at Pearl Harbor between 10 September ad 16 October. Enterprise was damaged again 26 October by two bombs and was repaired at Noumea. Enterprise then underwent overhaul at Bremerton Navy Yard from mid July to early November 1943 and received another, albeit short, overhaul at Pearl Harbor during July 1944. Damaged by a Kamikaze on 11 April 1945, Enterprise was repaired at Ulithi and back in action by 6 May. Struck again by a Kamikaze on 14 May, Enterprise arrived at Bremerton Navy Yard for repairs on 7 June and did not return to combat.

Thirteen Essex class carriers saw action in the war:

Essex was damaged by a Kamikaze on 25 November 1944 and was repaired at Ulithi.

Yorktown (CV-10) received a two month overhaul at Bremerton Navy Yard between 17 August and 6 October 1944. A bomb struck Yorktown on 18 March 1945 and repairs were effected at sea.

Intrepid was torpedoed on 17 February 1944 and received temporary repairs at Pearl Harbor between 24 February and 16 March before proceeding to Hunters Point, California, arriving there on 22 March. Repair work lasted into June. On 25 November Intrepid was struck by two Kamikazes and retired to California for repairs, arriving on 20 December and returning to duty at Ulithi on 13 March 1945. A near miss Kamikaze cause splinter and fire damage to Intrepid’s bow on 18 March; repairs were effected at sea. On 16 April Intrepid was again struck by a Kamikaze the damage from which forced yet another withdrawal from combat. Intrepid received temporary repairs at Ulithi, then at Pearl Harbor, and finally arrived in San Francisco on 19 May. Repairs lasted until 29 June. Intrepid’s proclivity for getting hit and spending so much time in the yard gave her the somewhat unfair nickname “The Dry I”.

Franklin was struck by two Kamikazes on 30 October 1944. After temporary repairs at Ulithi, Franklin proceeded to Bremerton for repairs and overhaul, which took from 28 November to 2 February 1945. Struck by two bombs on 19 March, Franklin suffered major damage from secondary fires and explosions. Temporary repairs were effected at Pearl Harbor and the ship proceeded to the Brooklyn NY Navy Yard, arriving on 28 April. Franklin did not return to combat.

Minor damage to the Ticonderoga from a typhoon was repaired at Ulithi between 25 and 30 December 1944. On 22 January 1945 Ticonderoga was struck by a Kamikaze, causing considerable damage. After a brief stop between 24 and 28 January at Ulithi, the ship proceeded to Pearl Harbor to disembark passengers and then arrived at Bremerton on 15 February. Repairs continued until 20 April.

Randolph was damaged on 11 March 1945 by a Kamikaze while anchored at Ulithi and repairs were effected there. The ship was struck by a stunting P-38, again while at Ulithi, on 7 June 1945. Repairs were effected on the scene.

Lexington (CV-16) was torpedoed on the night of 4-5 December 1943. Emergency repairs were made at Pearl Harbor and the ship arrived at Bremerton on 22 December. Repairs were complete of 20 February 1944. Struck on the island by a Kamikaze on 5 November, Lexington was repaired at Ulithi between 9 November and 11 December. In March and April 1945 Lexington underwent routine overhaul and repairs at Bremerton, leaving Alameda for combat duty on 22 May 1945 after workups.

Bomb splinters from a near miss damaged Bunker Hill on 19 June 1944. Repairs were effected at sea. Routine overhaul and yard work were conducted at Bremerton between November 1944 and January 1945. On 11 May 1945 the ship received serious damage from two kamikaze hits. After emergency fixes at Pearl Harbor the ship returned to Bremerton for repairs and did not return to combat.

Hancock received slight damage on 10 October 1944 from a bomb that passed through a gun mount and exploded in the water. Repairs were effected at sea. Fuselage and wing pieces of a shot down Japanese plane struck the ship’s flight deck on 25 November causing localized fires that were quickly extinguished. More damage occurred on 21 January 1945 when a bomb that had hung up in the bomb bay of a TBM dropped while the plane was moving forward after landing and exploded. (NB: my father was aboard with the TF-38 staff when this occurred. He had just stepped into the Flag Bridge head when the bomb went off. The head had an armored communications trunk on the flight deck side, so he was protected from the explosion. His boss, Jimmy Thach, at the same moment on the catwalk overlooking the flight deck, bent over to light a cigarette and was also spared. There were numerous casualties amongst the men on the walkway and adjacent to the bridge.) Emergency repairs were made at sea with follow up repairs at Ulithi. More fragment damage from a shot down Kamikaze, repaired at sea, occurred on 18 March. On 7 April a Kamikaze struck Hancock, crashing into parked aircraft, while its bomb struck the port catapult. Air operations were resumed in about an hour, but the ship was detached on 9 April and proceeded to Pearl Harbor for repairs, which lasted until 13 June. Hancock attacked Wake Island on 20 June and sortied on 1 July with TF-38 from San Pedro Bay for the final strikes on the Japanese home islands.

Bennington – Damaged by typhoon on 5 June 1945, repaired between 12 June and 30 June at San Pedro Bay, Leyte.

Wasp (CV-18) had a near miss bomb, which caused minor damage on June 18, 1944, repaired at sea. Wasp and struck by a bomb in March 1945 and on 13 April pulled into Bremerton for repairs which lasted to June. Wasp returned to TF-38 for the final strikes on Japan. (NB: Wasp was my father’s flagship when he was Com CarDiv14 in 1965.)

Bon Homme Richard – No Damage (NB: when BHR was converted to angle deck and steam catapults in the mid 1950’s my father was the XO. He made the first launch from the new catapults and the first trap on the angle deck.)

Shangri La – No damage

As you can see, most serious damage was repaired either at Bremerton or San Francisco.

quote:How large was the US army garrison?

US Army ground units on the island of Oahu on 7 December 1941 were:

Harbor Defenses of Honolulu HQ
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade
24th Infantry Division HQ
25th Infantry Division HQ
53d Coast Artillery Brigade (Anti-Aircraft)
15th Coast Artillery Regiment (Harbor Defense) (Type A)
16th Coast Artillery Regiment (Harbor Defense) (Type A)
64th Coast Artillery Regiment (Anti-Aircraft) (Semi-mobile)
97th Coast Artillery Regiment (Anti-Aircraft) (Semi-mobile)
98th Coast Artillery Regiment (Anti-Aircraft) (Semi-mobile)
251st Coast Artillery Regiment (Anti-Aircraft) (Semi-mobile), CANG
804th Engineer Aviation Battalion
34th Engineer Combat Regiment
3d Engineer Combat Battalion
65th Engineer Combat Battalion
8th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer Tractor Drawn)
11th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer Tractor Drawn)
13th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer Tractor Drawn)
52d Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer Tractor Drawn)
63d Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer Tractor Drawn)
64th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer Tractor Drawn)
89th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer Tractor Drawn)
90th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer Tractor Drawn)
19th Infantry Regiment
21st Infantry Regiment
27th Infantry Regiment
35th Infantry Regiment
298th Infantry Regiment, HING
299th Infantry Regiment, HING
Company A, 1st Chemical Mortar Battalion

quote:What if the third/fourth waves had been in support of an amphibious invasion?

Carried in what ships as the Japanese Army and Special Naval Landing forces already were on their way to assigned missions on the western and south western rim of the Pacific? There were neither troops nor shipping to move them available. Also remember the Kido Butai was planning on speed to get them in and out of the attack area. Transports could not hope to match half the Kido Butai’s cruising speed.

quote:Would this not have made a significant delay in the US response allowing Australia, New Zealand and India to come under direct sustained attack and occupation?

Carriers only carried a limited amount of avgas and ordnance. There were only two battlecruisers accompanying the Kido Butai, which, if sailing to support some kind of invasion force (and there were only a few beaches suitable for such on Oahu) would be sailing into pre-registered fire zones. This would have been the target of which the Coast Artillery types had dreamed for 50 years. Usual calculus for a successful assault is to outnumber the defenders at about 3 to 1, so they would need 8 infantry divisions (IJA divisions were smaller than USA divisions) alone. The Japanese did not have the wherewithal to move the necessary troops, did not have the available troops (mostly because the Army had them tied up in China), did not have the long term assault support forces, and did not have the logistics available to themselves to long term support an occupation of any of the Hawaiian Islands.

So, the answer to the question is ‘No” because they could not have successfully invaded, anyway.

[PMN1]

Puget Sound naval yard info

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/puget_sound-nsy.htm

[Lightning]

Hi PMN1,

Quoting you:
quote:Perhaps if they had used a wooden aircraft (what is the Japanese for 'aircraft whose name should not be mentioned)? :D

You and Ricky are evil, just evil! [}:)]

Regards,
Lightning

[PMN1]

Groggy

This would have made logistics more difficult and lengthened response time. Would this have focused the US on the Eastern Theatre?


It would have made them longer but the Japanese didn't seem to be too intrested in attacking the logistics train, they were after the warships and given the US ahipbuilding capacity I dount think it would have been too long before that 'gap' from extended Sea Lines of Communications would have been filled.

I agree in general with you but could the Phillipines been left for a second phase?


Even with MacArthur's aircraft being wiped out on the ground (several hours AFTER the Pearl Harbour attack)I cant see the Japanese leaving the Phillipines alone and the units making any Hawaii attack would need to regroup and rearm if they still existed as fighting formations. Take those formations away from the rest of the SEA invasion force and you are putting at risk to whole reason for going to war - the oil.

Good points, but could the air bases have been over run at the start, they would have been the priority?


It all comes down to troops and logistics and whatever you 'give' to any Hawaii attack force has to be taken from somewhere else AND the timing has to be perfect - those tropships will have to be at the invasion point the same time as the first wave attacks - not easy.

[PMN1]

An intresting link from the Hyperwar people

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-6.html