why do u think the luftwaffe failed to win in ww2?

[b-1]

when ww2 started the luftwaffe was the best. they had the most planes best fighters and well trained pilots.the only major air powers nere them were france, russia and britan. out of wich britan had the best aricraft. know we all now the germany won airpower in france and over there lines in russia for the most part. with britan the only real air power left by the eny off 1940-41 and ruaaia in power shape how could the luftwaffe lose with victory so close?

[GregP]

The Luftwaffe had a completely inept leader in Goering, and the Third Reich had a completely inept leader in Adoph Hitler.

Goering did not know how to employ aircraft ina atactical war and Hitler did not trust his leaders (Generals and advisors or listen to them. As a result, he made decisions in a vacuum, much as did Goering. When that happens, the decisions are flawed almost by default.

As late as mid-1944 he was still thinking Germany was winning. The only worse leader in the Axis was Benito Mussolini. Thanks heavens they were so bad or the Nazis could have won.

We owe our current situation to many peoples, but the Soviet Union took the brunt of the German onslaught for over two years. After 1943, the Soviet Air Force took it to the Luftwaffe on almost every count.

Bottom line: bad leadersip combined with a refusal to listen to the real situation so good battlefield decisions could be made and implemented resulted in poor execution.

[b-1]

i do not think the leaders had that big of a role in the down fall. yes they had a part in it but when u fly thoutsends of missions and kill hundreds of planes u lern how to win even if u have 2 leaders that think of them selfs as gods. the luftwaffe had so many good pilots in controle of many more pilots. in my mind it would have to do more with planes, tatics and supples then just 2 leader.

[Red Admiral]

How can you lose? Even if your aircraft are twice as good, that doesn't matter when your enemy builds 5 times as many. Just Russia alone built c. 5 times as many aircraft as Germany.

[simon]

You learn how to win...?

Apparently not otherwise they would have.
[u]
Moderator's note:</u>

B-1 please type in full English rather than a sort of semi-TXT language, many members here are not native English speakers and it can be difficult enough to communicate at times without the extra hassle of having to translate TXT talk to English.

This Forum doesn't have that high a turn over of posts, you will have more than enough time to type your reply in full before someone else responds.

[ickysdad]

quote:Originally posted by Red Admiral

How can you lose? Even if your aircraft are twice as good, that doesn't matter when your enemy builds 5 times as many. Just Russia alone built c. 5 times as many aircraft as Germany.


Red Admiral,
SU produced 5 times as many as Germany? The SU built something like 150,000 aircraft during the war(a very rough figure) ,Germany around 110,000-120,000(again a very rough figure). The UK came in at around 150,000 while the US probably produced over 300,000. Now all the Allies put together probably produced 5 times as many as Germany.

[ChrisMcD]

Production volumes are only part of the story.

The Germans made a number of seriously wrong assumptions and decisions in 1939-41 and were never able to recover from them.

1) Too tactical.

Hitler and Goering were too keen in numbers. Hence lots of short range/small load bombers like the He111. Strategic issues, like ocean reconaisance or cutting Russian rail communications were never dealt with properly.

2) Belief in Blitzkrieg as 'cost efficient'

Hitler deliberatly decided not to ramp up the German economy to full war production till very late ( Which is how Speer managed his maracles in 1943/5). This was based on the duration and cost of the campaigns in Poland, Norway and France, where the costs were easily recoved from the conquered.

Aircraft production was being cut back in 1940 and lots of long term projects were cancelled or cut back.

By the time the German economy was placed on a war footing it was much too late.

3) Anti technocratic leadership.

Goering in particular hated technology ( to paraphrase "Radar is boxes of coils and I hate boxes of coils"). So he Put playboys like Udet in charge of technical development and he allowed all sorts of projects to be messed up or cancelled. The Allies should never have been allowed to develop their lead in Radar and the jet fighters should have been introduced years earlier.


The massed numbers of the Allied airforces would have had a lot more of a problem facing jet bombers and fighters with precision guided weapons in 1943!

http://www.luft46.com/gmart/gmfw4-4.jpg

[ickysdad]

Except as far as jets go it wasn't beauocratic foul ups that held them up by developing engines that didn't need vital nickel or chromium(nickel was necessary in such things as gun barrels),a few experimental models were possible but not for serial production. The precision guided weapons sound good but it's one thing to make a few experimental models and quite another to introduce them to serial production. Further the Germans tried to develop 50's technology while a war was going on while the Allies took 30's technology(other than the atomic bomb) and pushed it to it's fullest.

[GregP]

Not placing the economy on a wartime footing and not building a strategic bomber and not coming out with anything better than the He-111, Bf-109, etc. sounds like just plain poor leadership to me.

As I stated earlier, poor leadership is at the top of the list, and I'm not talking about combat unit leaders. I'm talking about strategic vision that puts the combat units in a position to win.

The Nazis did not treat conquered peoples well and did not seek in a meaningful way to field better weapons. They made a myriad of prototypes, but never got any into battle. They fought with the He 111, Ju 87, Ju 88, Bf 109, FW 190, and a very small bit with the Me 262. The 111 was obsolete in 1940. The Ju 87 was obsolete in 1939. The Bf 109 was a good fighter at the start of the war, but got worse and heavier with each version until the Bf 109G, which was unpleasant to fly and had a performance disadvantage to almost everything it encountered from late 1943 on, but was the most procued fighter. The FW 190 was pretty good, but never got improved to the point where it offered a decisive advantage. The Me 262 was forward thinking, but was mismamaged from the outset.

Poor leadership coupled with poor tactics, coupled with waging a 2 or 3 front war coupled with Allied production numbers.

Last, they thought that they could break the British and Soviet spirit ... boy was THAT a mistake.

The Germans MIGHT have broken the Soviet will to fight if they had freed the Soviets and made them into productive citizens. Many Soviet citizens were hoping for exactly that. But by the Nazis treating Soviets as a subhuman people to exterminate, they awakened the Russian Bear with a vengeance, and once awakened and angry, the Soviet Union alone could have beaten Germany.

After about 1943, either the Soviets or the British-American side could have won on their own.

But ... those first 3 years of WWII were awfully nip and tuck as to who would win.

[simon]

quote:Originally posted by GregPLast, they thought that they could break the British and Soviet spirit ... boy was THAT a mistake.

..and regrettably a mistake that the RAF under Harris repeated.

quote:Originally posted by GregPThe Germans MIGHT have broken the Soviet will to fight if they had freed the Soviets and made them into productive citizens. Many Soviet citizens were hoping for exactly that. But by the Nazis treating Soviets as a subhuman people to exterminate, they awakened the Russian Bear with a vengeance, and once awakened and angry, the Soviet Union alone could have beaten Germany.

Unfortunately or fortunately depending on your viewpoint, that was simply not going to happen. The reason for war in the East was the Rassenkampf against the Slavic Untermensch (Apologees as I do not have Umlauts on my keyboard), remove that aspect and you remove the reason to strike East, keep that aspect and you remove the reason to treat the conquered populace humanely.

I disagree though that the Soviet Union alone could have beaten Germany though, I think devoid of Lend Lease and the Allies efforts int he West Germany could still have pulled it off, at the very least Germany not declaring war on the US December 8th 1941 might have put the Soviets in a trickier position.

[GregP]

Hi Simon. You have a very good point but, by 1943, Germany had already declared war on the USA and lend-lease was a fait accomplit.

I'm saying that the British-American side could have slacked up quite a bit about early 1944 and the Soviet Union would have pushed on into Berlin. Conversely, if the Soviet Union had slacked up about early 1944. we would still have beaten Germany.

My assumptions above are, of course, that history was as it happened up until that point.

If Germany had not declared war against the USA, then yes, Germany would have had a better chance against the Soviet union, especially in light of the early Soviet losses. What it might have meant is that the German drive might not have outrun the supply chain and the Russian winter might have been too late to save the Soviet union.

Playing "what if" is fun, but I tend to leave history as-is up until my proposed change.

So ... if everything went as it really did through 1943, then the Soviet union was in a position to defeat Germany outright whether or not we had kept up the pressure. That's all i was saying.

You are, of course, free to disagree.

[b-1]

german had weapons that even today would be a problem on the battle field. i dont me the v2 or the laser or wire guided missle. the tiger and king tiger we the best tanks of the war they lost to only the best russain tanks manly the IS modles and even then it was a tought fight. german troops form the start to the end were the best. there fighter pilots were great they had the resorces even with day and night bombing to keep the contry going. the more the allies attacked the germans the stronger they got. the americans saved the british and helped in a small way with the russians i thiunk that no mater what the germans would of lost the russian front at best the would of held moscow for a few mounths at best. the germans were fighting a war the even to germans would have lost. the best allie germany had was japan. japan had the naval power germany needed and germand had the ground technologe that japan need.

lets say germany one the battle in europe and russa and in africa. then japan took over china:) and the pacifc islands up to hawaii. well then there is only canda, america, south america and mexico well the first problem is how will german attack america. germany had no true landing force there navy at its best was 1/4 the sieze of the USA's navy and there was shore guns from 14" to 5". is u get past them then u have to fight in city's almost right away. and how would they controle the air.then we have japan they could take hawaii so long as germany attacks first. then they could use hawaii as an air base and a staging ground. then they have to attack and form the beging of the war the usa had better gound tactics weapons and supplie lines. i think that both contrys would need nucks and lots of them to win.

we got of topic just a little but its good to see the minds working

[GregP]

I think we'll have to agreee to disagree. I respect the Germans and realize that not all German troops were Nazis. They WERE very good, but, and here's the salient point, they lost.

So, the Allies must NOT have been that bad. The Tiger and Panzer were great tanks, but they were so complicated that very few were produced, and they were so heavy they got stuck in mud. The British Centurion was also a great tank and was available in numbers. The Sherman was a neat little tank that was completely outmatched in any tank battle, but it was there in numbers that meant it was around for the victory and provided great support for otherise unarmored ground troops, which, by the way, is what it was designed for. Not inconsequentially, it also had enough fuel to remain running and enough ammunition to fight, and there were spare parts avilable readily.

So yes, the Germans were impresive in both technology and weapons developed, but they didn't get enough into production to win the war. The Allies did.

One last instance. Everyone assumes the German u-boats were the best submarines. They might have been so, but they operated in a very target-rich environment. After all, all Allied convoys to Great Britain had to converge on Great Britain, which simply isn'yt all that big. In the Pacific, German submareines didn't do any better than American or Japanese submaries. It was a matter of finding the enemy without the benefit if radar and the Pacific is a BIG place. So, maybe the German submarines weren't really all that much better (at least until the Type XXI), they sinmply had the targets coming to them. It was a case of being in the right place at the right time, and the death rate in the U-Boat service was 75%. For the Allies it was MUCH better. So ... you make the call. I say the German u-boats were no better than ours. They were just there when war broke out and it took time for ours to arrive and get into the fray.

[Wuzak]

I think Greg is right when he says that Göering was inept. He basically reported to Hitler what Hitler wanted to hear.

For example, Hitler asked Göering if the Luftwaffe could supply the surrounded Wermacht outside of Stalingrad (?). Göering replied yes, when it was most assuredly beyond their capacity.

A similar situation happened in the Battle of Britain - Göering basically told Hitler that the RAF had been destroyed. Which they soon discovered was not the case.


So Hitler, however inept he was, never had clear information as to the true situation.

It was a similar story between Göering and his underlings.

As for German industry, there were so many companies doing similar projects, which led to a diversification of effort. A lot of technologies were delayed because of poor resourcing.


How to strike the USA? There were a few long range bomber projects that never actually made it to production, or even prototypes.

If they had conquered Europe the task of striking at the USA would have become less difficult, as the British Isles would have served as their bomber base, meaning reduced distance to targets.

They also had the V2 rocket program. Now the range of the V2 was insufficient to strike the USA, but, if I remember correctly, they had test launched V2 rockets from a submersible barge that would be towed behind a submarine. Such a device would have threatened much of the USA's eastern seaboard.

The other thing to consider is that had the UK been forced to surrender to Germany, the USA's options for striking Nazi held Europe would have been severly restricted. They too would have to develop ultra-long range bombers (B-29 may have been able to do the job).

Umlauts: ä ë ï ö ü

To get these hold down the ALT key then type 0228 and tehn release the ALT key for ä, 0235 for ë, 0239 for ï, 0246 for ö and 0252 for ü.

If you have Windows, of course. You can also find them in the Character Map, which is somewhere under accesories if you have it installed.

[GregP]

Good post Wuzak. I think these instructions for the German letters should be a sticky! :)

[Wuzak]

Thanks Greg.

It is not just the German letters that can be brought up that way. Basically there are 256 characters, and each can be brought up in that manner. Obviously it isn't any good to do that for regular letters, but for special characters like çèéáàåôì etc.

Alt + 0192 À
Alt + 0193 Á
Alt + 0194 Â
Alt + 0195 Ã
Alt + 0196 Ä
Alt + 0197 Å
Alt + 0198 Æ
Alt + 0199 Ç
Alt + 0200 È
Alt + 0201 É
Alt + 0202 Ê
Alt + 0203 Ë
Alt + 0204 Ì
Alt + 0205 Í
Alt + 0206 Î
Alt + 0207 Ï
Alt + 0208 Ð
Alt + 0209 Ñ
Alt + 0210 Ò
Alt + 0211 Ó
Alt + 0212 Ô
Alt + 0213 Õ
Alt + 0214 Ö
Alt + 0215 ×
Alt + 0216 Ø
Alt + 0217 Ù
Alt + 0218 Ú
Alt + 0219 Û
Alt + 0220 Ü
Alt + 0221 Ý
Alt + 0222 Þ
Alt + 0223 ß
Alt + 0224 à
Alt + 0225 á
Alt + 0226 â
Alt + 0227 ã
Alt + 0228 ä
Alt + 0229 å
Alt + 0230 æ
Alt + 0231 ç
Alt + 0232 è
Alt + 0233 é
Alt + 0234 ê
Alt + 0235 ë
Alt + 0236 ì
Alt + 0237 í
Alt + 0238 î
Alt + 0239 ï
Alt + 0240 ð
Alt + 0241 ñ
Alt + 0242 ò
Alt + 0243 ó
Alt + 0244 ô
Alt + 0245 õ
Alt + 0246 ö
Alt + 0247 ÷
Alt + 0248 ø
Alt + 0249 ù
Alt + 0250 ú
Alt + 0251 û
Alt + 0252 ü
Alt + 0253 ý
Alt + 0254 þ
Alt + 0255 ÿ

Ø is a diameter symbol.
æ is the correct symbol in the spelling of encyclopædia, often also written as ae.

If you have excel you can see what values equal which charcters. Type in numbers from 32 to 255 in column A, then in the corresponsing cell in column B type the formula =char(A1) for row 1.

[simon]

Thanks Wuzak.

B-1 I will have to respectfully disagree. The Tiger was certainly not the best tank of the war and any of the late war tanks, Panther, Tiger or Tiger II would be vulnerable to their Allied equivilents, Sherman Fireflies and Pershings were a match for them.

Their fighter pilots were great at the start, those leaving training schools toward the end were barely capable of flying and were as much a danger to themselves as the enemy, so you can't really make such generalisations.

Remember that the plan for Barbarossa was not to totally occupy the Soviet Union but to push the Soviets back over to the Urals (Which was where much of their industry had been relocated to, so that still leaves the possibility of an eventual Red counter-attack, plus a guerilla war in the occupied territories of nightmarish proportions.

Finally, I do not believe an amphibious invasion of continental US would ever have been a realistic proposition. The supply lines are just too long, the invasion fleet too vulnerable, seriously look at Overlord, that was hardly a walk in the park and that was crossing a small stretch of water after months of preparatory work, multiply the logistical problems by 100 and remove the preparation work (Since Germany would have had no way of mounting a bombing offensive against the US), and you get an inkling of how difficult ti could have been even if the USN didn't try to stop the invasion and intercept the invasion fleet.

[Tony Williams]

quote:Originally posted by Wuzak


Umlauts: ä ë ï ö ü

To get these hold down the ALT key then type 0228 and tehn release the ALT key for ä, 0235 for ë, 0239 for ï, 0246 for ö and 0252 for ü.

If you have Windows, of course. You can also find them in the Character Map, which is somewhere under accesories if you have it installed.
I find them in Word by using the 'insert' and then 'symbol' keys. I have a Word page, including signatures and phrases which I commonly use on the net, which I call up at the start of each internet session. This includes the various umlauts etc, so I can just copy and paste them as required.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk

[Wuzak]

That works too.

That takes you to a version of the character map.

[Kutscha]

It is not the 1940s but 1907, a German invasion of the US eastern seaboard discussion, http://63.99.108.76/forums/index.php?showtopic=15993

[b-1]

the firfly had a high velocity 17 pounder the pershing with a 90mm both cold take out panther tanks. but the 88 wich i will say is the best all around gun of the war out ranges all allied tank guns had a better muzzle velocity. when were talking about the king tiger the did improve its 88 the amour thick and the accuracy was good. i do agrea the all the german tanks were to complicated to reapair in the field. its one of the many resons why the tanks never got to fight the way they were meant.


king tiger pershing mra3(76w)

armor 88mm/L71/Q84 90mm/l50/Q70 76.2mm/L52/Q71
gun 191mm-34mm 148mm-11mm 140mm-18mm




sorry i need to find more on the firefly so i put the m4a3(76w)hvss in its place. if some one would like more infromation these tanks or another please let me know.

[Red Admiral]

Best tank of the war is obviously the A41 Centurion...

76mm Q.F. 17 Pounder Mk.IV L / 55
APDS Shot Mk.I ( Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot )
Weight Velocity 100 m 500 m 1000 m 1500 m 2000 m
3.71 kg 1284 m/s 221 / 221 mm 204 / 204 mm 185 / 185 mm 167 / 167 mm 151 / 151 mm

88mm PaK 43 L / 75
PzGr.40 / 43 ( Armor Piercing Composite Rigid )
Weight Velocity 100 m 500 m 1000 m 1500 m 2000 m
7.3 kg 1130 m/s 237 / -- mm 217 / -- mm 193 / -- mm 170 / -- mm 152 / -- mm

90mm M3 L / 52
APCR M304 Shot ( Armor Piercing Composite Rigid )
Weight Velocity 100 m 500 m 1000 m 1500 m 2000 m
7.62 kg 1021 m/s 243 / 243 mm 219 / 219 mm 192 / 192 mm 168 / 168 mm 147 / 147 mm

90mm Ansaldo 90/53 M41 L / 53
Effetto Pronto ( High Explosive Anti-Tank )
Weight Velocity 100 m 500 m 1000 m 1500 m 2000 m
10.5 kg 773 m/s 206 / -- mm 206 / -- mm 206 / -- mm 206 / -- mm 206 / -- mm




re - production numbers. Figures for Russia/Germany from 1944/45 IIRC, my memory is probably wrong.

[ickysdad]

red Admiral,
Actually there was one example of the Super pershing to see action with ,I think, the 90mm/73 .

[Red Admiral]

Unfortunately I don't have penetration data for the 90/70-73

The Pershing and Super Pershing were essentially the last of the old tanks for the US. The A41 Centurion is the most succesful tank postwar and the model for all other MBTs to follow having mobility, firepower and armour. The Centurion is still operational in some countries.

[ChrisMcD]

Yes, But

The best tank that actualy fought in reasonable numbers was undoubtedly the Panther!!

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/images/pz5abe.jpg

[curmudgeon]

quote:Originally posted by ChrisMcD

Yes, But

The best tank that actualy fought in reasonable numbers was undoubtedly the Panther!!



The German T34 ...

Seriously - in WW II tanks were mobile gun platforms, they had to stop to shoot. Effectiveness depended on use. After the first blitzkreig breakthroughs tanks were found to be vulnerable to infantry that didn't run. Tanks were fought with tank-killers (spg or A/T guns), artillery and aircraft. The British-developed APDS was probably the best anti-tank munition of the war.

Why didn't the Brits use the magnificent 4.7" AA gun in an anti-tank role (the German 88mm was an AA gun, used first, if I recall sources correctly, in North Africa as an expedient). I think the 4.7" is the progenitor of the current 120mm. By mid-late '44 there were thousands of them with nothing to shoot at.

[ickysdad]

Red Admiral,
I agree that the Centurion was the better of the two although the M-26 was the fore-runner of the M-46/M-47/M-48/M-60 line of tanks. I was just bringing up that the 90mm M3 wasn't the most powerful gun on a US tank in WW2.

[GregP]

Since this is an aviation forum, I must point out that the Russians produced a flying tank prototype.

Didn't get into production, but they DID try it.

[Red Admiral]

Flying tank? I can go one better and present the Russian Flying Submarine;

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v12/red_admiral/pll_risunok.jpg

[Lightning]

Hi Red Admiral,

Quoting you:
quote:Flying tank? I can go one better and present the Russian Flying Submarine;

Careful now. Your getting into "Tophe Country." :)

Regards,
Lightning

[Lightning]

Hi All,

Quite a few incidents come to mind, not in any particular order.

The Germans (panzers and Luftwaffe) had a golden opportunity to deal a deadly blow against the British and Free French at Dunkirk, but they held back and let them escape across the Channel back to England.

During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe leadership foolishly allowed the British RADAR sites to remain in operation thereby permitting the RAF to make maximum use of its limited fighter assets. Along with this, the pressure was taken off Fighter Command when the Luftwaffe command switched from targeting British airfields in order to carry out revenge raids against London and other British cities.

Another mistake, although too late to matter, was the misuse of the Me-262 jet as a bomber rather than concentrating them as defense fighters to intercept the Allied day-bomber streams.

In the last part of the war, the two biggest single factors in the defeat of the Luftwaffe were lack of fuel and lack of trained pilots. There were more than enough planes available, but there was no one to fly them, and, had there been, there would not have been sufficient fuel to fly them.

There were, of course, other reasons for the Luftwaffe's downfall, but these are the least-involved and most immediately obvious to me.

Regards,
Lightning

[Groggy]

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

Hi All,

Quite a few incidents come to mind, not in any particular order.

The Germans (panzers and Luftwaffe) had a golden opportunity to deal a deadly blow against the British and Free French at Dunkirk, but they held back and let them escape across the Channel back to England.

During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe leadership foolishly allowed the British RADAR sites to remain in operation thereby permitting the RAF to make maximum use of its limited fighter assets. Along with this, the pressure was taken off Fighter Command when the Luftwaffe command switched from targeting British airfields in order to carry out revenge raids against London and other British cities.

Another mistake, although too late to matter, was the misuse of the Me-262 jet as a bomber rather than concentrating them as defense fighters to intercept the Allied day-bomber streams.

In the last part of the war, the two biggest single factors in the defeat of the Luftwaffe were lack of fuel and lack of trained pilots. There were more than enough planes available, but there was no one to fly them, and, had there been, there would not have been sufficient fuel to fly them.

There were, of course, other reasons for the Luftwaffe's downfall, but these are the least-involved and most immediately obvious to me.

Regards,
Lightning




Hi Lightning,

Many years ago Adolf Galland told me there was no shortage of jet fuel in 1945? but he would not elaborate?

[Red Admiral]

"Tophe country"? But the flying submarine is actually real, just not built.

quote:During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe leadership foolishly allowed the British RADAR sites to remain in operation thereby permitting the RAF to make maximum use of its limited fighter assets.

How do you bomb wire strung between pylons?

[simon]

It wasn't so much that the Luftwaffe allowed the Radar stations to remain operational, more that they believed they had knocked them out, however as Red Admiral pointed out it was extremely difficult to knock out the masts themselves and any hits made against the operator's shacks were easily remedied by mobile units.

[ChrisMcD]

Hi Simon,

As I remember they spoofed the Ventnor station getting back on the air by simply rigging up a transmitter, while it took a lot longer to get the receivers sorted out.

[Kutscha]

The switch to bombing London was simular to what the 8th AF did. If it was an error by the LW, it was an error by the 8th as well. The Allies more or less left the German radar alone.

Christer Bergstom of the Red Star/Black Cross series of books thinks the 262 should have been used as fighter/bombers.

[Wuzak]

quote:Originally posted by Red Admiral

"Tophe country"? But the flying submarine is actually real, just not built.

quote:During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe leadership foolishly allowed the British RADAR sites to remain in operation thereby permitting the RAF to make maximum use of its limited fighter assets.

How do you bomb wire strung between pylons?


You bomb the base. I don't know if they had concrete foundations or what, but there would have had to be some sort of structure on the ground to support the towers. Destroy them, and the towers would come down.

Didn't the Germans have the attitude that the British could not have possibly figured out RADAR?

[Kutscha]

quote:Originally posted by Wuzak
Didn't the Germans have the attitude that the British could not have possibly figured out RADAR? Yes a Zepplin did a recon pre war and found nothing. Possibly because they were searching the wrong frequencies.

[curmudgeon]

quote:Originally posted by Wuzak

quote:Originally posted by Red Admiral

"Tophe country"? But the flying submarine is actually real, just not built.

quote:During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe leadership foolishly allowed the British RADAR sites to remain in operation thereby permitting the RAF to make maximum use of its limited fighter assets.

How do you bomb wire strung between pylons?

The actual interpretation was done in wood huts near the base of the towers ... but the Germans didn't know that.

Wrt German radar a lot of effort went into overcoming it - 100 Group, by 1945 the largest group in the RAF.

You bomb the base. I don't know if they had concrete foundations or what, but there would have had to be some sort of structure on the ground to support the towers. Destroy them, and the towers would come down.

Didn't the Germans have the attitude that the British could not have possibly figured out RADAR?

[Jemiba]

I cannot name sources in the moment, as I'm just sitting at my desk
during lunch break . But if I remember correctly,the Luftwaffe
leaders had at least mixed ambitions to destroying the british
radar, which was seen as a tool, to make the RAF "come out and
fight". I think, the most important aim wasn't to destroy
infrastructure, but the RAF fighter command, so that later on
bombing attacks could be made without the threat of fighter defence.
The Luftwaffe staff had learnt, that pure fighter sweeps were
completely ineffective, because they didn't meet a single british
fighter, so several bombing raids were mounted with an extraordinary
number of escorting fighters. It was still thought during the early
stages of the BoB, that the Luftwaffe could kill any fighter caught
in the air ...

[GregP]

About Groggy's statement that Adolph Galland stated there was no shortage of jet fuel in 1945, let's remember there weren't that many jets or jet-qualified pilots.

Jet fuel is somewhere between kerosene and diesel fuel, and there was probably enough for the jets that were serviceable, but there simply weren't that many.

Few resources implies no shortage since even a modest amount would suffice. The ME-262 was a resource sapping waste of time and energy compared with the returns it brought the Luftwaffe. The ME-163 was even more so. Ditto the Natter and otehr projects. They would have been better off producing the He-280 and running with it, but the engines were simply not up production ready when they were desperately needed. Hitler's decree that the 262 be used as abomber is seen as a big tactical mistake in a lot of circles, but I don;t think that quantities of ME-262's would have been available anyway due to engine development issues. If they HAD been, then there might have been a jet fuel shortage.

[Kutscha]

In 14 months 1433 Me262s were built (~100/month) of which 497 were destroyed by one method or another before reaching the LW.

In 9 months of production there was ~1700 K-4s (~188/month), ~6000 G10s (~665/month) and ~1800 D-9s (~200/month) produced. How many reached the LW I don't know.

The Jumo 109-004 ran on diesel.

[GregP]

OK, say 1000 Me-262s were put into the field in 50 airfields. That's 10 jets per airfield ... not too great a strain for fuel. Personally I think they were deplpoyed to more than 50 airfirlds, and many were unserviceable due to either battle damage or waiting for new engines. Let's assume thaht takes care of 50%. That's 5 jets per airfield.

Again, that's not much a fuel requirement.

[Wuzak]

quote:Originally posted by GregP

OK, say 1000 Me-262s were put into the field in 50 airfields. That's 10 jets per airfield ...


Er....20 jets per airfield.

But still not a huge drain on the fuel resources.

btw theoretically jet engines will run on anything that burns. So they could run on kerosine or diesel, or anything in between. Alcohol, even.

[simon]

Additionally for all the Me262s produced from what I'd read only about 300 actually reached their units.

[Kutscha]

quote:Originally posted by simon

Additionally for all the Me262s produced from what I'd read only about 300 actually reached their units.
You could check this site Simon, to be sure.
http://www.stormbirds.com/werknummer/index.htm

[Mark J]

Jet fuel is Kerosine with an anti bug (gladisporium resenee..spelling):) additive and anti icing additive.

I understand diesel is just a little bit lower in the cracking tower than kerosine, so it's a bit heavier and has a detergent added to stop heavy carbon deposits in the combustion chamber. Ever wondered why diesel froth's up when filling the tank, it's the detergent. You can run your diesel truck on kerosine and a jet on diesel, both fuels being very similar.

I thought the early German jet engines ran on petrol/gasoline at one stage....

cheers

[Lightning]

Hi All,

Quoting me:
quote:In the last part of the war, the two biggest single factors in the defeat of the Luftwaffe were lack of fuel and lack of trained pilots. There were more than enough planes available, but there was no one to fly them, and, had there been, there would not have been sufficient fuel to fly them.

The responses to this statement have addressed the availability of jet fuel. As has been pointed out by GregP, there weren't that many jets in Luftwaffe service, so even a small amount of jet fuel would have been adequate to keep them in the air (Qualified pilots?--a different story). The main fighter strength of the Luftwaffe lay with the piston-engined fighters. These aircraft ran on aviation gasoline. Even with the synthetic fuel produced by the Germans, there was most certainly a critical shortage to the point that training and operational flights were drastically curtailed.

As to the vulnerability of RADAR installations to air attack, they are probably more easily knocked out of service than ordinary communicatins sites. Their signals are very directional and of much higher frequencies than the HF (high frequency) radios in use at the time. Their antennas and transmission lines were relatively sensitive to any kind of damage or disruption as were the transmiters and receivers themselves.

It was not a matter of not being able to destroy the sites as much as it was of the Germans underestimating their value. They simply put other, less important, targets higher up on their list of priorities.

Regards,
Lightning

[Lightning]

Hi Red Admiral,

Quoting you:
quote:Tophe country"? But the flying submarine is actually real, just not built.

I didn't have any idea that the Russians had such a novel idea in the works. I don't want to be picky, but, if it was never really built, it may have been a real idea but not really real. :)

quote:How do you bomb wire strung between pylons?

Very easily. Have you ever seen films of what a "Bangalore torpedo" does to barbed wire?

Regards,
Lightning

[Kutscha]

How does one put a Bangalore torpedo on the antenna wires from an a/c?

[Lightning]

quote:How does one put a Bangalore torpedo on the antenna wires from an a/c?

The obvious point of the comment was that an explosive charge among the wires--be they barbed wires or antenna wires--is devastating.

The Bangalore torpedo can easily blast a wide swath through many strands of strong, heavy barbed wire. Consider an aerial bomb containing several hundred times as much high explosive detonating among, or immediately below, the relatively thin strands of a RADAR antenna array. Also consider the effect of the blast on the mounting towers and any ancillary buildings and equipment. Is there really any doubt in anyone's mind that a well-placed bomb can knock out a RADAR antenna?

[Red Admiral]

Clearing swathes of barbed wire? The explosion tosses the wire up into the air and it comes down again only more tangled with more sharp bits.

quote:Is there really any doubt in anyone's mind that a well-placed bomb can knock out a RADAR antenna?

One of today's antennae is no problem, but the antenna of this time in southern england were massive. Probably getting on for 200x50m or so which is 10,000sqm. Those numbers are very approximate. The size and spacing makes them kinda hard to destroy. Ju-87s tried a few times and failed.

[Kutscha]

The Germans dropped many bombs on the Chain Home sites yet failed to cut one wire 300' in the air.

[b-1]

some of u think the senturion was the best tanks of ww2 or close to but then were never test in combat. the pershing was even if it was limited. the few times german tigers fought pershing the 88 still killed a few and the 90mm atill had problems getting past the front armor of the tigers.

as for radar site bombing. well im shocked the hit enything. the germans had great dive bombing pilots they were fast and accure. its very hard to hit something that will seam as big as a needle going 400-500 mph one a 75%-85% dive.

[GregP]

Good topic!

There are lots of opinions out there, huh?

A complete read of this topic gives a lot of potential reasons why the Luftwaffe didn't win in WWII. They were a great, world-class air force at the time and had demonstrably the best pilots, but I;m sure the Nazis would NEVER have started the war if they had really thought they would be in for a 4+-year, 3 front (eastern front, western front, Africa)war.

Hitler may have been a greedy egomaniac, but even he would have thought twice if he could have been convinced of the magnitude of the scope of the war he was about to start. He may well still have started it give the information, but my guess is that he would have waited for more military strength buildup before starting, maybe for 2 or more years.

[Wuzak]

There are some pilot training hours stats posted somewhere on this forum.

It basically shows how before and after the start of teh war the Germans spent much more time training their pilots than the British. By the end of the war the situation was completely reversed.

[Red Admiral]

quote: some of u think the senturion was the best tanks of ww2 or close to but then were never test in combat.

Never tested in combat? The Centurion is one of the most widely used tanks post-war.

* Korean War - United Kingdom
* Suez Crisis- United Kingdom
* Six Day War - Israel
* War of 1965 - India
* Liberation of Bangladesh/War of 1971 - India
* Yom Kippur War - Israel
* Vietnam War - Australia
* Angola Bush War - South Africa
* Gulf War - United Kingdom as Centurion AVRE's

Why did the LW lose air superiority and the war? Simply because there was a massive disparity in numbers that any amount of pilot skill and technological advantage cannot make up.

[b-1]

centurion was never battle tested in ww2. i am sorry for not be clear. when we talk about mbt's the centurion is one of the best. but the new germon tanks are pushing htere way back up to the top.

alittle of topic. does enyone here think germany will try to start a new word war?

looking at the military weapons that germany started the war with im schocked to see they did well in the first 3 years. they had a small navy to fight the british and french with. the tanks that they har were weaker then then the allies in the first year.only there fighter planes were not outdated right away. for a contry that thought the navy let them down it was the german navy that almost won the war for them.they also had the most powerfull ships at the time. i think the bismark and her sister ship could take on the 2 yamato class and at least fight to a draw.

[Lightning]

Hi Red Admiral,

Quoting you:

quote:Clearing swathes of barbed wire? The explosion tosses the wire up into the air and it comes down again only more tangled with more sharp bits.

Sorry, Red Admiral, but you're wrong here. In many of these discussions, we all have to rely on what we have read or been told about the topic in question. In this case, however, I'm speaking from personal experience.

I have trained on the use of the Bangalore torpedo as well as on the uses of other types of explosives--TNT, dynamite, C4, detonation cord, etc. These charges can be used to accomplish many different types of tasks e.g. cutting charges, quick-entry, penetration of armor, cratering charges to name a few. It depends on what type explosive is used, and how the charge is applied, shaped, concentrated, or configured.

The Bangalore torpedo comes in sections that can be threaded together to produce a linear charge of from several feet to several yards long, depending on the depth of the wire barrier to be breached. It is slid completely under the wire and then detonated. The blast goes upward and out to the sides. The result is a relatively free path through the obstacle. This sure beats the wire-breaching technique whereby a soldier throws his body across the wire to form a bridge across which the other soldiers run (especially if you're the one on the wire).

Regards,
Lightning

[Red Admiral]

Hi Lightning, I think you'd have personal experience but the idea just seems illogical to me.

quote:does enyone here think germany will try to start a new word war?

No.

[simon]

A new word war... What you mean like shouting "Schnitzel!" and "Bratwurst!" across the channel? :D

No, no power in Europe currently would attempt to start a new world war simply because the rest of Europe would almost instantly band against them, the US would almost certainly get involved and in any case modern European armies are simply too small to attempt the sort of advances and conquests of WW2/WW1 time. Plus modern wars are extremely expensive, more so even than WW2, and with the pictures in the books of the aftermath of WW2 no-one is going to want their cities looking like Hamburg or Hiroshima.

[b-1]

i was reading today about the ww2 cruisers. when i was ready i found out something that i thought was interesting. as u all mite or mite not know ww2 was a cruisers war no other was to that time were they ever used or build right. when i heard of the Prinz Eugen i was shocked at the power it had and that it suck the Hood with its 8-inch guns not the Bismark. Then i find out for all the great power german cruisers had one major problem the power plant.The were a pain in the butt even on there best day.then i read some more about japans crusers and they are even better then germanys. faster better armor better guns and training and we cant for get about the longlance.with the best cruisers being off the takao class. for all the great ideas that made these crusers good it would not have been so easy if it was not for the Royle Navy wich unitle the last few years of ww2 was the best but they had to give way to the US Navy wich had one class of cruiser wich some mite say they are battlecruisers but the baltimore class was the best of them all at 17,000 tons

[simon]

Please type using full English words: "you" not "u", "might" not "mite".

Remember this is an international forum, if native English speakers have to take extra time to translate your posts it could be even worse for non-natives. Equally if none-native speakers can take the time and consideration to post in full English, I think it only fair that the courtesy is returned.

Use of capital letters and paragraphs also will make your posts easier on the eye and therefore more likely to be read.

I'm not trying to be the spelling and grammar police here, typos happen and are a natural occurance on a discussion forum, but please make the effort to type your replies out fully.

[b-1]

quote:Originally posted by b-1

! was reading today about the ww2 cruisers. when i was ready i found out something that i thought was interesting. as u all might or might not know ww2 was a cruisers war no other was to that time were they ever used or build right.

Then i heard of the Prinz Eugen i was shocked at the power it had and that it suck the Hood with its 8-inch guns not the Bismark. Then i find out for all the great power german cruisers had one major problem the power plant.The were a pain in the butt even on there best day.

Then i read some more about japans crusers and they are even better then germanys. faster better armor better guns and training and we cant for get about the longlance.with the best cruisers being off the takao class.

For all the great ideas that made these crusers good it would not have been so easy if it was not for the Royle Navy wich unitle the last few years of ww2 was the best but they had to give way to the US Navy wich had one class of cruiser wich some mite say they are battlecruisers but the baltimore class was the best of them all at 17,000 tons

[Red Admiral]

Re:cruisers, something more along my lines of expertise.

The "fact" that Prinz Eugen sunk HMS Hood is unsubstantiated and generally regarded to be wrong. A 380mm shell penetrating the aft magazines is thought to be more likely cause.

The word that best sums up the Hipper/Prinz class of cruisers is poor. Their guns were good, their armour weak and their powerplant tempermental. It just isn't possible to have 1940s steam plants with 1930s technology.

The word that best describes the Japanese cruisers is "structurally weak". They crammed far too much onto too small a hull. The Mogami class had to be enlarged by about 85% because as built the hull just could not carry the loads. Even so, all the IJN cruisers had poor seakeeping.

With regards to RN, a large navy on the strategic offensive needs numbers and not qualitatively superior ships. Although individually weaker, having about 3-4 times as many ships massively helps to sway the balance in the RN's favour.

Baltimore class (1940) - better than the Japanese cruisers but not as good as the Italian Zara class from 1929. Fairly good ships on the whole but redundant. A Baltimore also cost the same to build as a KGV class battleship (UK 1936)

Slightly drifting away from aircraft......

Please type more coherently and use at least some grammar.

[b-1]

the baltimore was finished in 1943 as a 17,000 tons curiser with 9 8-inch guns in 3 turrets and 12 5-inchAA and the 8-inch guns were marknew 8-inch gun model firing 10 times faster the then old marks and with a rand of 14 miles.

as for the italian cruisers they never got the good end of eny fight they were pritty ships and fast but had low range and poor armor with weapons that look well on paper. the zara class was a design that was good for a CL not a CA with 8 8-inch guns and 5.9-inchs of armor, and displacing 11,500 tons it was a much weaker ship then the baltimore class

[ickysdad]

Baltimore class (1940) - better than the Japanese cruisers but not as good as the Italian Zara class from 1929. Fairly good ships on the whole but redundant. A Baltimore also cost the same to build as a KGV class battleship (UK 1936)

Slightly drifting away from aircraft......

Please type more coherently and use at least some grammar.

[/quote]
I wouldn't say the Zara's to be better than a Baltimore.

[Romantic Technofreak]

Sorry if I answer so late, but I was just too busy and this simple question needs a complex answer.

The initial question was why the Luftwaffe lost. Before, I had the opinion that, in WWII, successes on both sides were mainly the result of air superiority. More thorough research, what I have done in the last years, shows that this is not true by bigger parts. I shall conclude that it is even questionable if the Luftwaffe lost at all. The Luftwaffe could have been as efficient as it might have been, the war was lost for Germany depending on different reasons, and the Luftwaffe became a victim of this defeat. What includes that the Luftwaffe really got defeated by different occasions.

1. No overall strategy, no plan

We should not forget that WWII was NOT planned by Germany. In late August/beginning of September 1939, Hitler thought he had outmaneuvred the Western Forces by his treaty with Stalin, and they would never wage a war for Poland. That was already the first fatal error. But Hitler had known his risk. It was Göring who told him "We should not play va banque right now". Hitler replied "I have played va banque all of my life!"

It was also not possible to foresee that the Western Forces would carry on the war after the defeat of Poland, and Britain even after the fall of France. Hitler always thought to get into business again with the Western Forces, because they should have known his main enemy was located in the east. In fact, the strategic position of the Western Forces, unlike 1914, in 1939/40 was desperate, and they had not foreseen Poland to fall at all and the more not so quickly.

A strategic war, against Britain, the USSR and the USA altogether, was far beyound the imagination of Hitler and his generals by 1938/39, even if the fall of France could have been calculated. Every sensible voice would have uttered an "Impossible!". It was also never obvious by that time that Italy and Japan would join Germany´s war. They were loose allies, but not friends, had been Germany´s opponents in WWI like the Allied states as well, and were even objects of the Nazi racist bias.
So, the Luftwaffe could not get a strategic planning by the time when it would have been necessary.


2. Hitler´s lacking of strategic abilities

Hitler had been only private in WWI, he never had a general staff education. He didn´t know how to use a compound of weapons. He wasn´t able to estimate the need of getting possession of strategic positions. He had no idea that an air force had to be more than an instrument to execute fierce attacks, and he was a complete ignorant about sea warfare. But contrary to the Kaiser in WWI, he mingled into nearly every decision of his army staff and his frontline commanders, once he even phoned a lieutenant in the first line to attack with his twenty men against a superior Soviet strength.

If there was no plan in 1938/39, also later there was nothing. Hitler didn´t understand that Britain was his main strategic opponent. Britain wasn´t only a main sea power and a stubborn opponent to Nazi ideology and German imperialism. Britain also had an unique geostrategic position. Without Britain, the whole Allied warfare against the European continent stood and fell. Hitler considered Britain as of Germanic nature and as possible ally. He never realized that democratic-British and nazi-German attitudes never could join, and that Britain by no means would be ready for peace with a standing Germany at what time ever.

The racist attitude also lead to an underestimation of the other main Allied powers. Hitler thought, the USSR (slavians) and the USA (negroes, jews) were no match for German warfare as long as the German leadership would be cleared of any Jewish influence. These thoughts are somewhere between nonsense and madness.

The Luftwaffe had to carry the burden of this strategic aftermath. This would have been alone enough to explain the Luftwaffe´s failure. But the story still continues.


3. Insufficient coalition warfare on the Axis side

A close coalition of the three main Axis powers would have been necessary for a win strategy. But as I explained above, there wasn´t only any strategy, the Axis powers also were not very close. Also Italy never calculated the possibility of a lengthy and destructive war, and I wonder if Japan ever did (although by 1939 she already stuck in this kind of war, against China).
Italy only wanted to profit from German victories, without carrying a lot of burden. Japan wanted to keep a policy of free hand against all other powers as long as possible, until it was too late. Once in such a war, Italian leadership, armament and armament industry potential proved completely insufficient, by this annihilating the here and there good performance of single troops and units. And Japan´s attitude to open the war against the USA I have to consider as doubtful at the highest. Although Yamamoto is often considered as genius until the present day, I think he was nothing of that. The attack on Pearl Harbour probably was the worst single strategic decision of WWII. It opened the chance for Roosevelt to enter the war, when before his hands were bound by the congress and the public opinion. It was unnecessary, because Japan could have gotten the raw material sources in Dutch India without attacking the US. Destroying a battlefleet was nonsense when the attacker himself, correctly, puts the emphasis on carrier warfare. And not occupying Hawaii, after the destruction of the American carriers had failed, was the worst mistake.
Like Germany, also Japan had no idea that standing Western powers would not return into negotiations after the first shot was done, the Japanese were hoping for a diplomatical solution until they had to surrender. Correspondingly, they never developed a win strategy.

The Luftwaffe has no role in these considerations. If the Axis powers should have won, it would have been necessary to develop one.


3. Lack of strategic orientation

As I argued above, there was no overall strategy for the Axis powers. Consequently, their air forces lacked any strategic orinetation. There were nearly no strategic bombers, and what is even worse, no long-range fighters to escort attacks far behind the Allied lines. Long range air-sea war was not more than improvided. And the defensive-strategic orientation in form of long-range nightfighting to shoot down the Allied bombers on their landing approach, was too few and had no system.
Effective bomb attacks on the North American continent would have been impossible, but to clear the seas from Allied ships with the help of land-based bombers would have been essential. To hit the Soviet aramament industry and the transport lines behind the Urals also could have been a paying target.


4. Wrong decisions in ground warfare

Lack of overall strategy and lack of personal leadership abilities made Hitler also meeting wrong decisions in ground warfare. It is surely questionable, but an argument, if Manstein said "if you cannot wage a strategic warfare just don´t do it". He meant to invade England just after the fall of France, without any preparation by bombing. But it is true that Britain would have been caught in a phase of absolute weakness...

To invade the USSR without having beaten Britain first surely was Hitler´s biggest mistake. If you look at the map of the USSR and consider the course of the real war, this huge country looks absolutely invincible. But this is not true. The campaign was very successfull during the first months of the war, and German troops made 700 km within 6 weeks (border to Smolensk). Two or three weeks more, they could have reached the degree of longitude of Moscow, another four weeks for to reach the eastern tip of the proposed big encirclement near Gorky. The proceeding could have been done because the opponent was very weak at that time and could not build a longer frontier, only defend more or less isolated places. It was Hitler who annihilated the victory of his own troops. Being unsatisfied with the fact of Soviet troops escaping from German encirclements, he ordered the proceeding to stop and to clear the frontier, by small encirclements near Vyasma and Br´ansk. The battles were victorious, but too much time was lost, and the material started to become worn out. After Br´ansk , there came the mud. Hitler ordered his troops to attack anyway and now ruined their force by this. By November, the fuel storage was also low. Hitler didn´t let his troops retreat to a safer line, but forced them to resist the now coming Soviet counterattacks without giving ground. Also, winter clothing was standing ready for transport to the frontier, but Hitler ordered the railway to carry fuel and ammunition instead, so a big amount of the German army became frozen during the ice-cold Russian winter.

The counterattacks in front of Moscow were possible because the USSR could take troops from the border of the Japanese occupied territories in Eastern Asia. The Japanese had offered Hitler to join into the war against the USSR, but for whatever reason Hitler had sent them to the south instead. So, they kept their non-aggression treaty with Stalin until the latter terminated it and attacked himself.

Also in the Mediterranean theater, the Axis could have performed a lot better. Italy, although performing inadequately from the beginning, kept the supreme command until the surrender of the kingdom, thus hampering an efficient warfare under German signs. Malta was never invaded, Crete was not used as base to conquer Egypt, and Rommel´s troops were not enough reinforced to win at El Alamein. The reinforcements didn´t come before the Allies had landed in Northwest Africa. They landed in Northern Tunisia - but not doing much more. They were fresh, but it had to be Rommel´s worn out troops to attack the Allies at Kasserine, after a retreat lasting for four months. Rommel had requested von Arnim, the commander of the Axis troops in Northern Tunisia, to join in the attack for to perform a pincher operation, but von Arnim refused. The American, British and French troops in Algeria and the western edge of Tunisia were far away from home, suffered from the long supply line and could have brought into serious danger if this supply was hurt. Rommel won at Kasserine, but had to end the offensive and to retreat to the exposed Mareth line to stop the approaching British 8th army. As this position easily could be circumvented, it came as it had to come: Rommel had to retreat to the north of Tunisia.

I always had thought that the battle of Moscow was lost because it was too cold for the Luftwaffe to take off. The latter is true, but not the conclusion. Air operations had no substantial effect on the battle. I always had thought that the Allies won in Northwest Africa by their superior air power. But by the turn of 1942/43, there was no Allied superiority in that theater. By numbers, there was a stalemate, and by quality, the American fighters P-38, P-39 and P-40 proved to be inferior to the Axis fighters and suffered severe losses. Only the Spitfires (Mk. V) could keep up with the Axis fighters, but were not able to force a decision.
On the other hand, as I argued above, the lacking of a strategic orientation really defeated the Axis in one part of the strategic air war of this theater, and this is night bombing. The effort to hurt the supply was undertaken by German and Italian night bombing against the Algerian harbours. But there were only very few bombers, and the Algerian coast was protected by radar equipped Beaufighters that shot down a lot of Axis bombers. In Norway, it needed only few attacks on harbours to make the Western Forces south of Narvik retreat. What if efficient attacks on Algerian (and later Moroccan) harbours had taken place, after the Beaus were destroyed on the ground by strategic daylight attacks under the escort of FW 187s?
So, the Axis power became weaker every day in Northwest Africa, and the Allied one became stronger, until the Axis forces in Tunisia had to surrender in May 1943 (with the Italians holding on six says longer than the Germans did), and the Allies were on the jump to Sicily. There were no Mustangs, and Thunderbolts in that place, and the Spitfire Mk. IX only appeared when the decision already was done. The battle was lost by wrong strategic decisions, in the long-term planning and on the battlefield as well.

In the second phase of the war, Hitler refused to perform big offensive operations at all. He interrupted the battle at Kursk, and the only exception, the Ardennes offensive, was already done in a period of hopelessness, while Hitler even sacrificed a big amount of the remaining German fighter force for this. Continuing defensive leaves no chance to win, if you have the power for this or not. Anyway, it was too late.


5. No thorough personal planning

A long-lasting war needs continuous supply of well-trained pilots. To become a fighter pilot frontline-ready, IMO you need two years. The Luftwaffe ran out of pilots already during the BoB, and later never could satisfy the need of the frontier. Also, because a lot of pilots and crewmen were sacrificed in the completely insufficient bomber and Stuka forces. Not only that, Göring gathered hundred thousands of men in his Luftwaffe field divisions, while the German army considered these little-trained infantry troops as useless. They would have also been badly needed as pilots and air-servicemen.
Also, because Germany had no formal air transport groups at the beginning of the war, the Ju 52s of the Dutch campaign had to be manned by flight instructors. As experienced flight instructors are even more valuable than pilots and the Dutch campaign was involving very high casualties for the German airborne forces as well as for their carriers, this loss could not be balanced for the rest of the war.
Further, Hitler squandered a big amount of the German manpower to build up and man completely useless fortifications. This is a thought of WWI, not valid in a period of war by movement.


6. Did the Luftwaffe loose at all?

If you see so many decisions on which the Luftwaffe had no influence on, it is questionable if the Luftwaffe lost at all. In the east, the Luftwaffe could beat the Soviet air force at any time the former could gather enough fighters. In the west, new weapons like jet fighters and air-combat rockets made Allied commanders sweat nearly until to the very German surrender. And the long list of marvellous German fighter aces with hundreds of kills each! is unique in the whole WWII history. The defeat of the many, the victory of the few?

Regards, RT

[Red Admiral]

b-1, you are thinking of Des Moines not Baltimore. Baltimore was smaller at 13000t. Des Moines was comissioned in 1948 with automatic 8" guns. You'll get no argument that she was the most powerful cruiser, but the sheer size sort of goes against the entire rationale for cruisers.

The Zara class were about 12000t with 150/90mm armour. Armour that is thicker and covers more of the ship than other cruisers. The problem for them was being engaged by 3 Battleships at 3000m range at night.

ickysdad, I would say they were better. Maybe not all-round, but I still want Zara in a one-on-one.

[Groggy]

quote:Originally posted by Red Admiral

b-1, you are thinking of Des Moines not Baltimore. Baltimore was smaller at 13000t. Des Moines was comissioned in 1948 with automatic 8" guns. You'll get no argument that she was the most powerful cruiser, but the sheer size sort of goes against the entire rationale for cruisers.

The Zara class were about 12000t with 150/90mm armour. Armour that is thicker and covers more of the ship than other cruisers. The problem for them was being engaged by 3 Battleships at 3000m range at night.

ickysdad, I would say they were better. Maybe not all-round, but I still want Zara in a one-on-one.


Hi,

Range? Was it just for the "Inland Sea", AA armament?

[b-1]

i was wonder were u got the infromation Red Admiral. i would like to see it. you are right about the auto loader thanks for clearing it up.

Jane has let me down i cnat find the Zara wich year did i get sunk



I know that the zara class with no main turrets and only fuel could make 35-36 knots but when they put every thing on it they made only 29 knots. the armor mite have been every were that it should be but that only will help when ur fighting guns smaller then 8 -inch.

I dont know what some people think of battlecruisers. They are know for the speed and fire power not for armor. there is a good chance tht with a lucky should the Prinz Eugen did sink the Hood. Biskmark with its 15-inch guns had the better range and could do more damage with each hit. the Prinz Eugen could fire more wit ha greater chance to hit.

The 8-inch gun of ww2 was the best naval gun. in the few times a Cruiser fought a Battlechip the cruiser did well. show that the more shot you can fire and the faster u can move and torpedos are a winning punch.

[Lightning]

Hi All,

Quoting Kutscha:
quote:The Germans dropped many bombs on the Chain Home sites yet failed to cut one wire 300' in the air.

In the earlier part of the battle, the Germans did knock out British RADAR sites. I believe that most were from Coastal Command, but a few were from Fighter Command. They were out of service for several days, after which they were repaired. In the interim, the British fooled the Luftwaffe into thinking that the sites were still operational by broadcasting RADAR-like signals from other radio transmitters.

The big mistakes the Germans made were to (1) believe their inept intelligence that declared RADAR not to be important, (2) think, as a result of the bogus transmissions, that they hadn't knocked those sites off the air, (3) not follow up the initial attacks against these sites with subsequent attacks.

As to the height of the antenna wires, just because a supporting tower is 300 feet high (were they that high?) doesn't mean that every wire strand of the array is that high. And how could anyone really know that the bombings "failed to cut one wire . . ."?

Several things are certain: Some RADAR sites were temporarily knocked out. They were knocked out by high explosive bombs detonating in or around the antenna arrays and their supporting towers. I don't think the repair crews spent much time examining the wreckage in order to determine whether the wires were or were not cut by the blasts.

Regards,
Lightning

[ickysdad]

Red Admiral,
On the Baltimore verse Zara, I'm just pointing out that the USN ships are much newer and usually newer vessels are better,at least in the all around sense.
Romantic Technofreak,
I wouldn't say the P-38 was inferior to the '109F's, 109G's, or 190A's they faced in the MED . It seems Luftwaffe pilots that faced them in the MED had a pretty healthy respect for them. Also the P-40 wasn't the dog it's been made out to be even against 109's 0r 190's while it & the P-39 were a handful for the Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front . Of course all three of the USAAF fighters would have been at a disadvantage at the start of the Northwestern African campaign because thier pilots weren't as expierenced as thier counterparts.
You can change history and/0r luck for the Germans BUT that also allows another person to change history and/or luck for the Allies and when you get into that the Allies have more to change.

[Kutscha]

They were higher.:)

One such 360-foot-high (110 m) transmitter tower can now be found at the BAE Systems facility at Great Baddow in Essex. It originally stood at Canewdon, and is said to be the only Chain Home tower still in its original, unmodified form.

Between 12 and 18 August 1940 on one occasion a section of the radar chain in Kent, including the Dover CH, was put out of action by a lucky hit on the power grid. However, though the wooden huts housing the radar equipment were damaged, the towers survived owing to their steel girder construction. Because the towers were untoppled and the signals soon restored, the Luftwaffe concluded the stations were too difficult to damage by bombing and so left them alone for the rest of the war.

[Red Admiral]

Zara - range more than adequate for use in the Med. AA armament adequate. For use in the Med. they are fine. Main armament and protection excellent. The ten year gap between Zara and Baltimore does help quite a bit.

Information on Zara here http://www.marina.difesa.it/storia/Almanacco/Parte04/Navi0420.htm on Italian Navy site. Another good site is http://www.world-war.co.uk with lots of info on cruisers. Sunk in 1941 from gunfire from HMS Warspite, Valiant and Malaya at about 3000m.

quote:[battlecruisers]They are know for the speed and fire power not for armor. there is a good chance tht with a lucky should the Prinz Eugen did sink the Hood. Biskmark with its 15-inch guns had the better range and could do more damage with each hit. the Prinz Eugen could fire more wit ha greater chance to hit.

There is no chance that the 203/60 carried by Prinz Eugen penetrated the 12" belt on Hood and went into the aft magazines. The comments regarding the 203mm being more effective than the 380mm defy common sense and any knowledge of ballistics.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood_p1.htm

quote:The 8-inch gun of ww2 was the best naval gun. in the few times a Cruiser fought a Battlechip the cruiser did well. show that the more shot you can fire and the faster u can move and torpedos are a winning punch.

Every time a cruiser tried to shoot at a battleship it got heavily damaged or sunk. There are no examples when the cruiser came out winning.

This is very far from the original discussion.

[Ricky]

I remember reading in a book (Typhoon Pilot by Desmond Scott, a New Zealander who was CO of a Typhoon Squadron) about a Typhoon attack on a German radar station. A full Squadron attacked the mast with rockets. The mast still stood, but almost all of the cables connecting the mast to the equipment on the ground were chewed into pieces, rendering the station out of action.

The obvious drawbacks were that the wires could be replaced fairly quickly - it was never intended as more than a temporary knockout, designed to cover some Allied activity - and that the AA defenses claimed 2 or 3 Typhoons.

Is it me, or do we have about 3 different discussions going on here?:)

[Groggy]

quote:Originally posted by Red Admiral

Zara - range more than adequate for use in the Med. AA armament adequate. For use in the Med. they are fine. Main armament and protection excellent. The ten year gap between Zara and Baltimore does help quite a bit.

Information on Zara here http://www.marina.difesa.it/storia/Almanacco/Parte04/Navi0420.htm on Italian Navy site. Another good site is http://www.world-war.co.uk with lots of info on cruisers. Sunk in 1941 from gunfire from HMS Warspite, Valiant and Malaya at about 3000m.

quote:[battlecruisers]They are know for the speed and fire power not for armor. there is a good chance tht with a lucky should the Prinz Eugen did sink the Hood. Biskmark with its 15-inch guns had the better range and could do more damage with each hit. the Prinz Eugen could fire more wit ha greater chance to hit.

There is no chance that the 203/60 carried by Prinz Eugen penetrated the 12" belt on Hood and went into the aft magazines. The comments regarding the 203mm being more effective than the 380mm defy common sense and any knowledge of ballistics.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood_p1.htm

quote:The 8-inch gun of ww2 was the best naval gun. in the few times a Cruiser fought a Battlechip the cruiser did well. show that the more shot you can fire and the faster u can move and torpedos are a winning punch.

Every time a cruiser tried to shoot at a battleship it got heavily damaged or sunk. There are no examples when the cruiser came out winning.

This is very far from the original discussion.

Hi,
Many thanks for the info,

It was said that a lot of the shells from the Bismark were dud? and for obvious reasons this was kept very quite.

Many years ago I read that it was possible for the above reason that it was thought that a very unlucky hit on or near a turret caused a chain reaction leading to the magazine going up.

Did the Hood have a battery of AA rockets on the Turret top?

The Hood’s armour was never fully up graded.

The Italian Navy were converting a Liner in to an Aircraft Carrier, what aircraft were planned for shipboard use?

[ickysdad]

quote:Originally posted by Red Admiral

Zara - range more than adequate for use in the Med. AA armament adequate. For use in the Med. they are fine. Main armament and protection excellent. The ten year gap between Zara and Baltimore does help quite a bit.

Information on Zara here http://www.marina.difesa.it/storia/Almanacco/Parte04/Navi0420.htm on Italian Navy site. Another good site is http://www.world-war.co.uk with lots of info on cruisers. Sunk in 1941 from gunfire from HMS Warspite, Valiant and Malaya at about 3000m.

quote:[battlecruisers]They are know for the speed and fire power not for armor. there is a good chance tht with a lucky should the Prinz Eugen did sink the Hood. Biskmark with its 15-inch guns had the better range and could do more damage with each hit. the Prinz Eugen could fire more wit ha greater chance to hit.

There is no chance that the 203/60 carried by Prinz Eugen penetrated the 12" belt on Hood and went into the aft magazines. The comments regarding the 203mm being more effective than the 380mm defy common sense and any knowledge of ballistics.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood_p1.htm

quote:The 8-inch gun of ww2 was the best naval gun. in the few times a Cruiser fought a Battlechip the cruiser did well. show that the more shot you can fire and the faster u can move and torpedos are a winning punch.

Every time a cruiser tried to shoot at a battleship it got heavily damaged or sunk. There are no examples when the cruiser came out winning.

This is very far from the original discussion.
Red Admiral,
You forget that US cruisers came out on top at First Guadalcanal. IMHO even the rebuilt London, Wichita & New Orleans class come pretty close to any other type of CA.
You also have to add in the FC and radars of the Allies .I know those aren't part of the ship design HOWEVER any navy or airforce even if it has the best planes & ships won't get far without the proper tatical & strategic concepts.

[Red Admiral]

quote:It was said that a lot of the shells from the Bismark were dud? and for obvious reasons this was kept very quite.

Many years ago I read that it was possible for the above reason that it was thought that a very unlucky hit on or near a turret caused a chain reaction leading to the magazine going up.

Did the Hood have a battery of AA rockets on the Turret top?

The Hood’s armour was never fully up graded.

The Italian Navy were converting a Liner in to an Aircraft Carrier, what aircraft were planned for shipboard use?

http://www.hmshood.com/photos/HoodPhotos3.html

No UP rockets on top of X turret. One possibility for Hood's loss was a fire in the 4" AA mounts which then spread to the magazine. Straight belt penetration seems more likely.

German shells on the whole were fairly poor. If they impacted at angles of over 30° then they were no longer effective. Quite a few just general duds as well possibly up to 50% or so. One often brought up alternate history is if one of the shells that hit HMS Prince of Wales (in company with Hood) had exploded. This shell became lodged next to the machinery after having passed through the TDS. This shell was dud and did not explode. However if the shell had actually worked properly it would never had reached the ship's side as it had already passed through c.30ft of water. i.e. the hit was impossible with a working shell.

Hood was never fully rebuilt. If she survived her encounter with Bismarck it would have been. It was planned to remove the 5" end belts and replace the upper 7" belt with 12" plate. Deck armour would have been strengthened to about 5". Also new machinery, superstructure and secondary guns.

The Regia Marina were converting the carriers Aquila and Sparviero. Aquila was nearly complete by 1943. The aircraft planned for use were Fiat G.50bis and Re 2001. The G.50bis use I find unlikely and think an entire airgroup of Re 2001 more likely (40-50ac). Two Re 2001s were modified thus; one to carry a short 450mm torpedo and the other to carry a LOX bomb(don't have anything to confirm this). So carrying a multi-purpose strike fighter. I imagine in time the Re 2001 would be replaced by Re 2005/2006 which were better fighters and had better load-carrying ability. 1000kg central hardpoint on Re 2005 which was to carry a torpedo. The hardpoint was off-centre to not interfere with the ventral radiator. When tested with a load of 680kg there was little affect on stability, a slight tendancy to drift right on take-off. For the Re 2006 it was planned to move the ventral radiator to the wing leading edge (like Sea Fury/Firefly). One Re 2001 was modified like this and results found to be satisfactory. The Re 2005 didn't incorporate this feature due to lack of time.

Radar, if we believe the film "The Battle of Britain" (more of a documentary than a film really) then one of the radar stations was put out of action temporarily due to hits on the control huts on site.

quote:You forget that US cruisers came out on top at First Guadalcanal. IMHO even the rebuilt London, Wichita & New Orleans class come pretty close to any other type of CA.
You also have to add in the FC and radars of the Allies .I know those aren't part of the ship design HOWEVER any navy or airforce even if it has the best planes & ships won't get far without the proper tatical & strategic concepts.

1st Guadacanal can't really be called a "win" for the US cruisers. Both sides had terrible mauling with Hiei eventually being abandoned and sunk by aircraft. It depends what capability you want with cruisers. For oceanic escort you can't get much better than the Counties. For cruiser vs. cruiser, Zara is good. For trying to sink USN battleships the Japanese cruisers are good. Compare them against what they were meant to do and they all seem to turn out pretty good.

Radars of the allies - recently I found out that the Regia Marina had 2-3 sets of EC3ter radar sitting in a warehouse for two months before Matapan. It took the RM twenty months before the sets were fitted to Littorio!

All in all, its all subjective.

[ChrisMcD]

Fascinating thread(s)

I think the most impressive (albeit somewhat impractical) cruisers were the Japanes heavy ones like Mogami

http://www.combinedfleet.com/mogami01.jpg

What the French used to call a 'fierce face'

Taking Rickys point about knocking out radar stations with Typhoons

"Almost all of the cables connecting the mast to the equipment on the ground were chewed into pieces, rendering the station out of action. The obvious drawbacks were that the wires could be replaced fairly quickly"

According to Alfred Price's book "Instruments of Darkness" on the WWII radar war some of the most important German radars were very vulnerable.

Apparently the 'Wasserman" towers rotated on a central sleeve which was very easily jammed - and could only be lowered at one point of it's rotation!

Also the 'Mammut' sets were calibrated using aircraft flying test patterns - so replacing the mass of unprotected feeder cables at the back was a real pain!

These were the two most important coast watch radars as they were the most difficult to jam.

So the Spits and Typhoons of the Second Tactical airforce managed to put all but 16 of the 92 cross Channel radar sites out of action by D day.

[Groggy]

quote:Originally posted by Red Admiral

quote:It was said that a lot of the shells from the Bismark were dud? and for obvious reasons this was kept very quite.

Many years ago I read that it was possible for the above reason that it was thought that a very unlucky hit on or near a turret caused a chain reaction leading to the magazine going up.

Did the Hood have a battery of AA rockets on the Turret top?

The Hood’s armour was never fully up graded.

The Italian Navy were converting a Liner in to an Aircraft Carrier, what aircraft were planned for shipboard use?

http://www.hmshood.com/photos/HoodPhotos3.html

No UP rockets on top of X turret. One possibility for Hood's loss was a fire in the 4" AA mounts which then spread to the magazine. Straight belt penetration seems more likely.

German shells on the whole were fairly poor. If they impacted at angles of over 30° then they were no longer effective. Quite a few just general duds as well possibly up to 50% or so. One often brought up alternate history is if one of the shells that hit HMS Prince of Wales (in company with Hood) had exploded. This shell became lodged next to the machinery after having passed through the TDS. This shell was dud and did not explode. However if the shell had actually worked properly it would never had reached the ship's side as it had already passed through c.30ft of water. i.e. the hit was impossible with a working shell.

Hood was never fully rebuilt. If she survived her encounter with Bismarck it would have been. It was planned to remove the 5" end belts and replace the upper 7" belt with 12" plate. Deck armour would have been strengthened to about 5". Also new machinery, superstructure and secondary guns.

The Regia Marina were converting the carriers Aquila and Sparviero. Aquila was nearly complete by 1943. The aircraft planned for use were Fiat G.50bis and Re 2001. The G.50bis use I find unlikely and think an entire airgroup of Re 2001 more likely (40-50ac). Two Re 2001s were modified thus; one to carry a short 450mm torpedo and the other to carry a LOX bomb(don't have anything to confirm this). So carrying a multi-purpose strike fighter. I imagine in time the Re 2001 would be replaced by Re 2005/2006 which were better fighters and had better load-carrying ability. 1000kg central hardpoint on Re 2005 which was to carry a torpedo. The hardpoint was off-centre to not interfere with the ventral radiator. When tested with a load of 680kg there was little affect on stability, a slight tendancy to drift right on take-off. For the Re 2006 it was planned to move the ventral radiator to the wing leading edge (like Sea Fury/Firefly). One Re 2001 was modified like this and results found to be satisfactory. The Re 2005 didn't incorporate this feature due to lack of time.

Radar, if we believe the film "The Battle of Britain" (more of a documentary than a film really) then one of the radar stations was put out of action temporarily due to hits on the control huts on site.

quote:You forget that US cruisers came out on top at First Guadalcanal. IMHO even the rebuilt London, Wichita & New Orleans class come pretty close to any other type of CA.
You also have to add in the FC and radars of the Allies .I know those aren't part of the ship design HOWEVER any navy or airforce even if it has the best planes & ships won't get far without the proper tatical & strategic concepts.

1st Guadacanal can't really be called a "win" for the US cruisers. Both sides had terrible mauling with Hiei eventually being abandoned and sunk by aircraft. It depends what capability you want with cruisers. For oceanic escort you can't get much better than the Counties. For cruiser vs. cruiser, Zara is good. For trying to sink USN battleships the Japanese cruisers are good. Compare them against what they were meant to do and they all seem to turn out pretty good.

Radars of the allies - recently I found out that the Regia Marina had 2-3 sets of EC3ter radar sitting in a warehouse for two months before Matapan. It took the RM twenty months before the sets were fitted to Littorio!

All in all, its all subjective.


Many Thanks, Was a Royal Navy super carrier considered with the "18inch gun" Battle Fleet before the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty?

[Red Admiral]

Never seen a reference to any carriers larger than Furious et al during that time period.

"2. The RN and the development of the aircraft carrier

i.The RN had several aircraft carrier designs in service during the Great War, before the techniques of carrier operations were clearly understood. Once the Admiralty decided that it wanted carriers, it invested very heavily in all sorts of them, with the full and enthusiastic support of the GF and the RN.
ii.The original WT limited overall RN carrier strength, one ship of which did not materialise because of the Slump.
iii.The RN’s two best carriers of 1922 were very difficult to significantly improve by rebuilding. Both Hermes and Eagle were good ships for their day, but proved to be too small. The only relevant modifications that could have been carried out were
a.The removal of the surface gunnery equipment, including the tripod and spotting tops;
b.Improved HA armament;
c.The elimination of the round-down, aft;
d.The modification of the fore parts of the flight decks.
iv.Furious in her final form did not utilise the full potential of her hull volume as effectively as Courageous and Glorious.
v.It would be very to discover if there were structural limitations to extending either the hangar or the superstructure further forward on Courageous, Glorious and Furious. Once the concept of the lower flight deck had been abandoned (and it was considered very useful in the early 1930’s), the flight decks could have been extended forward on supporting girders, as per Akagi and Kaga. This would have given all three ships a flight deck with a hump in the middle, but in fact this would have been operationally irrelevant.
vii.Argus and Langley would be obsolete, and Eagle and Hermes would be obsolescent by the end of the 1920’s. However, they all served their purpose in developing the concept of what an aircraft carrier was, and equally importantly was not.

3

iv.Historically, the RN wanted 5 aircraft carriers, in order to be able to carry out its tactics of two high-speed carriers scouting in front of the Fleet, and two lower-speed carriers covering the Fleet.
vi.The RN’s main problems would have been:
a.The purpose of the carriers;
b.The design and size of the carriers;
c.How to fund the new carriers;
d.When to schedule the carriers;
e.How to fund the aircraft, and
f.How to regain control of the RNAS.
ii.The official RN policy was to lay down one carrier every three years after 1930 and the reconstruction of Courageous and Glorious, including the stillborn 1929 carrier. In fact, the much-evolved first carrier in this program was laid down in 1935 as Ark Royal. (Its cancellation in 1929 was probably a hidden technical blessing).

5.

iv.In 1923 the RN considered two carriers (and a mini-carrier of 10,0000 tons). These were:
a.16,500 tons, 35 aircraft, 471 tons per aircraft;
b.25,000 tons, 50 aircraft, 500 tons per aircraft.
v.The 16,500-ton carrier had a 15’ hangar and a narrow flight deck. By 1924, it had grown to 17,200 tons, with the addition of a 5.5” surface battery, in addition to a 6 * 4.7” AA battery. It was also looking obsolete.
vi.The bigger ship carried three 8” twin turrets, which limited the hangar space. This design was also not pursued.
vii.By 1927, the Admiralty was looking at 23,000-ton studies, similar to Glorious, thinking that 24,000 to 25,000 tons could allow for aircraft development. One of these designs was budgeted for 1929, but was cancelled because of the financial crisis.
viii.Courageous had two hangars, each 550’ * 60’ * 15’, and a flight deck 576’ * 91.5’. She carrier 48 aircraft. "

From WTRE essay by "H Flashman"

Naval aviation was in its infancy and the aircraft of the time limited in capability. The RN already had a large number of carriers and a lead in naval aviation. There was no particular reason to build more.

[Lightning]

Quoting Kutscha:

quote:They were higher.

One such 360-foot-high (110 m) transmitter tower can now be found at the BAE Systems facility at Great Baddow in Essex. It originally stood at Canewdon, and is said to be the only Chain Home tower still in its original, unmodified form.

The towers referred to here were the transmitter towers that were part of the final configuration of the system. The receiver towers were made of wood and were only 240 feet high.

The above-stated heights are those of the tops of the towers. The transmitter antenna arrays are described as "curtains" while the receiver arrays were stacked sections. The "mean" heights of these arrays were 215 feet and 45 feet (lower elements) respectively. The actual heights of the lowest sections were quite a bit less. These antennas were, however, not the ones in general use during the Battle of Britain.

During the Battle (wich was relatively early in the war), the system widely in use was the intermediate stage. The towers for this configuration were all made of wood and were were all 240 feet high. There were two towers each for the transmitting and receivibg antennas respectively. Again, the the actual "curtains" and "sections" of the lowest elements reached quite a bit lower, and were substatially below 100 feet.

So the antennas were not single strands of wire hung 360 feet in the air. All of the towers were not sturdy steel structures. And the "curtans" were certainly vulnerable to bomb blasts with their shock waves, wind blast, and last, but not least, their tremendous flash of heat.

quote:Between 12 and 18 August 1940 on one occasion a section of the radar chain in Kent, including the Dover CH, was put out of action by a lucky hit on the power grid. However, though the wooden huts housing the radar equipment were damaged, the towers survived owing to their steel girder construction. Because the towers were untoppled and the signals soon restored, the Luftwaffe concluded the stations were too difficult to damage by bombing and so left them alone for the rest of the war.

This was a short period of only six days with only light damage inflicted--a half-hearted attempt if there ever was one. This perfectly illustrates my point that the German intelligence had convinced the decision makers that the RADAR sites were unimportant and therefore not worth the effort.

The British RADAR was probably the single most important element in winning the Battle of Britain--certainly more important than the Spitfire itself. Had the Luftwaffe fully understood that the outcome of the Battle depended in such a large part on the continuous functioning of this technology, does anyone believe that, because of the fact that a few towers failed to come down after only a few initial attacks, they would have been left alone for the remainder of the Battle because they were "too difficult" to destroy. On the contrary, continued, concentrated attacks would have been a certainty.

The elimination of the RADAR sites would have drastically cut the effectiveness of the British fighter force by spreadig it out too thinnly in order to cover all the possible approach routes available to the German raiders. At the time, Fighter Command didn't have the resources to do that effectively.

As to the vulnerability of the above-described antenna structures to aerial bombing, consider this: Throughout the war, determined bombing attacks were able to destroy or heavily damage ships, factory buildings, airfield facilities, railrod rolling stock and marshallig yards, steel and re-enforced concrete bridges and dams, submarine pens, dock facilities, etc.,etc., etc. Why on Earth would such relatively flimsy RADAR sites be that difficult to destroy?

The answer to this question is obvious and certainly doesn't require a lot of "war gaming" or conjecture to arrive at: They weren't! At a time when the destruction of these sites could (and probably would) have tipped the scale of victory to the Luftwaffe, the Germans foolishly considered them unimportant and failed to assign top priority to destroying them--a fatal mistake!

[Ricky]

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

As to the vulnerability of the above-described antenna structures to aerial bombing, consider this: Throughout the war, determined bombing attacks were able to destroy or heavily damage ships, factory buildings, airfield facilities, railrod rolling stock and marshallig yards, steel and re-enforced concrete bridges and dams, submarine pens, dock facilities, etc.,etc., etc. Why on Earth would such relatively flimsy RADAR sites be that difficult to destroy?
Well, all the examples you have given are large, solid structures that are relatively easy to hit with a variety of ordnance, and that tend to fall in when a portion is damaged (eg: a factory roof - although it is worth pointing out that most bombed factories, on both sides, were typically back in production after a few days of sweeping up rubble.). RADAR masts were an open lattice of supporting struts (wood or metal) essentially quite similar in structure to the Wellington bomber - and that deserved it's reputation for strength when damaged. Ok, so it is not a perfect comparison, but you get the picture.

If RADAR was so easy to destroy, why didn't the Allied simply obliterate the German RADAR stations? On only 1 occaision that I know of did they shut them down, and even then it was only by cutting the cables, not knocking over the masts, and all were back up and running within a fairly short time. Think of all the Allied aircrew that ould have been saved...

[Lightning]

Hi Romantic Technofreak,

Quoting you:
quote:and by quality, the American fighters P-38, P-39 and P-40 proved to be inferior to the Axis fighters and suffered severe losses. Only the Spitfires (Mk. V) could keep up with the Axis fighters, but were not able to force a decision.

If you compare the performance figures of the P-38 variants used in Africa against those of the contemporary fighters, both axis and allied, used there, you'll see that, except for maneuverability, the Lightning could outperform them.

The big problem was not with the Lightning's performance; it was because the American pilots were terribly inexperienced, they used out-moded tactics and formations, and they were up against combat-tested Luftwaffe pilots who had already been fighting in the air for quite a while.

If those same American pilots had been issued Spitfire Vs upon arrival in Africa, the result would have been no better. You'll see that after those US squadrons had been stood-down, retrained, and given new leadership, their return to combat in their P-38s was a shock to their erstwhile foes who, as usual, underestimated the Lightning and mistakenly blamed the plane and not the pilot for its initial problems.

Regards,
Lightning

[Lightning]

Hi Ricky,

Quoting you:

quote: RADAR masts were an open lattice of supporting struts (wood or metal) essentially quite similar in structure to the Wellington bomber - and that deserved it's reputation for strength when damaged. Ok, so it is not a perfect comparison, but you get the picture.

Have you ever seen the effects of a very strong wind on the the strands of wire strung between telephone poles?--how they sway, flap, and, in many cases, break? You no doubt have seen how seemingly strong steel towers and similar structures are able to be toppled and twisted by winds of no more than about 100 mph. These winds, as they affect such objects, do not come close to the blast effects of high explosive. Again , do you really believe that a wire "curtain" antenna and its mast present a resistant structure to well-placed bombs? (And if enough attacks would have been mounted against those antennas and buildings, there certainly would have been a significant amount of well placed bombs, the inaccuracies of WWII aerial bombing notwithstanding.)

Regards,
Lightning

[Ricky]

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

Hi Ricky,
Have you ever seen the effects of a very strong wind on the the strands of wire strung between telephone poles?--how they sway, flap, and, in many cases, break? You no doubt have seen how seemingly strong steel towers and similar structures are able to be toppled and twisted by winds of no more than about 100 mph. These winds, as they affect such objects, do not come close to the blast effects of high explosive. Again , do you really believe that a wire "curtain" antenna and its mast present a resistant structure to well-placed bombs? (And if enough attacks would have been mounted against those antennas and buildings, there certainly would have been a significant amount of well placed bombs, the inaccuracies of WWII aerial bombing notwithstanding.)

Regards,
Lightning


Well, one thing is that high winds are a consistant pressure, rather than odd blasts of high pressure, which is an entirely different scenario...

I'm not arguing that radar stations (masts especially) were impossible to kill, just that it would be pretty difficult - much harder than knocking in a factory building.

[Ricky]

Gratuitous Picture time!

Here is a picture of three original (but since slightly modified) radar masts situated on the cliffs at Dover - the picture was taken from the battlements of the Great Keep of Dover Castle.

http://tanksww2f.chollie.co.uk/files/Aircraft/Radar%20Masts.JPG

[ChrisMcD]

Leaving aside the vulnerability of the Chain Home radar sites, I think the major problem was the the Luftwaffe command structure did not realise the implications of radar as a means of controling a defensive fighter force and its effect as a force multiplier.

This is yet another failing that can be put down to the Luftwaffe High Commands preoccupation with blitzkrieg and the offensive war.

This lack of understanding of how the British defences were integrated and controled is shown by the complete lack of any attempt to knock out the fighter control centres or to block their radio control transmissions. Just compare this with the huge amount of effort put into interfering with the Luftwaffe's night fighter control in 1943.

The Germans were well aware of the lower technical quality of the British Radar (they captured and early mobile set at Dunkirk) and never realised that the RAF's command, control and communication philosophies and systems were vastly superior.

I gather that, when the Freyas were used to vector Me110's onto the Wellingtons in the Helligoland Bight at the start of the war, the delay in interception was so lengthy that the British refused to believe it had been initiated from a radar contact.

[Ricky]

Again, I wonder, as the Allies had such first-hand knowledge of the value of radar, and the huge boost it gives to your defences, why did they only seem to go with ECM tactics (window, spoof raids, etc) rather than bomb the radar sites to pieces?

Does anybody know why? Was it just a case of not being worth the effort, or was it a case of 'damn the defences, we must bomb the targets' (not unlike the old submarine vs. convoys question)

[Groggy]

quote:Originally posted by Ricky

Again, I wonder, as the Allies had such first-hand knowledge of the value of radar, and the huge boost it gives to your defences, why did they only seem to go with ECM tactics (window, spoof raids, etc) rather than bomb the radar sites to pieces?

Does anybody know why? Was it just a case of not being worth the effort, or was it a case of 'damn the defences, we must bomb the targets' (not unlike the old submarine vs. convoys question)


Hi

Because if it had not been thought of already by the "Enemy" they did not want the idea to be copied and throw the home defence in to confusion.It would also show our state of knowledge the "enemy" radar.
In the case of D Day it allowed some radars to be left to detect a Spoof invasion force.

[Ricky]

quote:Originally posted by Groggy


Because if it had not been thought of already by the "Enemy" they did not want the idea to be copied and throw the home defence in to confusion.It would also show our state of knowledge the "enemy" radar.
In the case of D Day it allowed some radars to be left to detect a Spoof invasion force.
But by about 1943/1944, Germany was really in no position to seriously threaten the English radar sites, with most of its forces out East or working hard to counter the bombing offensive, and with a growing concentration of Allied air power in England. Between the fall of France and the start of Barbarossa was IMO the only time they realistically had the resources available to really press home such an offensive.
Attacking German radar would certainly involve having to guard the Chain Home system against reprisals, but that would doubtless be a better occupation for all those Spitfires than the largely fruitless 'Rhubarbs'. And the potential benefits are enourmous - just swap the country names round on the reasons why Germany should have attacked English Radar!

[Lightning]

Hi Ricky,

Quoting you:
quote: Again, I wonder, as the Allies had such first-hand knowledge of the value of radar, and the huge boost it gives to your defences, why did they only seem to go with ECM tactics (window, spoof raids, etc) rather than bomb the radar sites to pieces?

Does anybody know why? Was it just a case of not being worth the effort, or was it a case of 'damn the defences, we must bomb the targets' (not unlike the old submarine vs. convoys question)

You have, yourself, given two very good reasons for the lack of effort on the part ov the Allies to destroy the German RADAR sites:

1. The advanced methods that had been developed in counteract the effectiveness of RADAR e.g. "window", jamming, "spoofing," etc. rendered the German RADAR far less important to the defence of the Reich as compared to the Battle of Britain several years earlier when these methods were either unknown or in their infancy.

2. By the time the major bombing campaign against Germany was underway, the Allies had an ever-increasing advantage in long-range bombers and fighters at the same time German defensive assets were declining in both availability and quality (not so much in numbers produced). The Germans knew what the target destinations of the massive bombing raids were even without RADAR, and their ground observer stations were also effective in tracking the bomber streams. Again, it was a matter of priorities, but this time the the decisions proved to be the right ones--That was not the case with the Germans in the Battle of Britain.

In our discussion regarding the vulnerability of RADAR sites to aerial bombing, we lost sight of the main issue. The reason the sites were not destroyed was that the leadership of the Luftwaffe listened to very bad intelligence that led them to believe that RADAR was unimportant to the British defences. In fact, at one point, Goering actually told the target planners not to even bother with the sites.

In every detailled account of the Battle that I have ever read, this was given as the reason for not following through with the destruction of those sites. I have never read that the reason was that they were too difficult to destroy. What commander in his right mind would allow the enemy to win such a decisively important battle merely because their main weapon was a difficult target? The vast majority of targets of vital importance are made to be difficult to destroy. And, given the flimsy nature of towers and wires, the decision to ignor the RADAR sites was certainly due to the underestimation of their true importance.

Regards,
Lightning

[Ricky]

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

1. The advanced methods that had been developed in counteract the effectiveness of RADAR e.g. "window", jamming, "spoofing," etc. rendered the German RADAR far less important to the defence of the Reich as compared to the Battle of Britain several years earlier when these methods were either unknown or in their infancy.
But these methods were still far from foolproof, and the Germans continually developed counter-counter-measures...
ECM did downgrade the effectiveness of German defences, but frankly not by as much as removing the RADAR altogether would.
Imagine how much harder it would be for a controller to vector intercepting fighters onto a bomber stream by relying on reports from ground stations.

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

2. By the time the major bombing campaign against Germany was underway, the Allies had an ever-increasing advantage in long-range bombers and fighters at the same time German defensive assets were declining in both availability and quality (not so much in numbers produced). The Germans knew what the target destinations of the massive bombing raids were even without RADAR, and their ground observer stations were also effective in tracking the bomber streams. Again, it was a matter of priorities, but this time the the decisions proved to be the right ones--That was not the case with the Germans in the Battle of Britain.
Um, even with RADAR the Germans had to rely quite heavily on guesswork (educated guesswork, but still guesswork) regarding the target of bomber streams - measures such as taking roundabout routes to the target etc could (and sometimes did) result in German ground controllers allocating the bulk of their fighter defences to an area that was not under attack. While it is quite easy for a ground observer to spot the location and direction of a large bomber formation in daylight, especially if they are leaving con-trails, this is not possible in cloudy conditions, or more importantly at night...

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

In our discussion regarding the vulnerability of RADAR sites to aerial bombing, we lost sight of the main issue. The reason the sites were not destroyed was that the leadership of the Luftwaffe listened to very bad intelligence that led them to believe that RADAR was unimportant to the British defences.
Entirely agreed. My stance is tha the British RADAR sites could have been kept mostly out of action by a sustained bombing campaign, but that this would have been harder, and caused more casulaties to the Luftwaffe, than is sometimes assumed.

[Groggy]

quote:Originally posted by Ricky

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

1. The advanced methods that had been developed in counteract the effectiveness of RADAR e.g. "window", jamming, "spoofing," etc. rendered the German RADAR far less important to the defence of the Reich as compared to the Battle of Britain several years earlier when these methods were either unknown or in their infancy.
But these methods were still far from foolproof, and the Germans continually developed counter-counter-measures...
ECM did downgrade the effectiveness of German defences, but frankly not by as much as removing the RADAR altogether would.
Imagine how much harder it would be for a controller to vector intercepting fighters onto a bomber stream by relying on reports from ground stations.

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

2. By the time the major bombing campaign against Germany was underway, the Allies had an ever-increasing advantage in long-range bombers and fighters at the same time German defensive assets were declining in both availability and quality (not so much in numbers produced). The Germans knew what the target destinations of the massive bombing raids were even without RADAR, and their ground observer stations were also effective in tracking the bomber streams. Again, it was a matter of priorities, but this time the the decisions proved to be the right ones--That was not the case with the Germans in the Battle of Britain.
Um, even with RADAR the Germans had to rely quite heavily on guesswork (educated guesswork, but still guesswork) regarding the target of bomber streams - measures such as taking roundabout routes to the target etc could (and sometimes did) result in German ground controllers allocating the bulk of their fighter defences to an area that was not under attack. While it is quite easy for a ground observer to spot the location and direction of a large bomber formation in daylight, especially if they are leaving con-trails, this is not possible in cloudy conditions, or more importantly at night...

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

In our discussion regarding the vulnerability of RADAR sites to aerial bombing, we lost sight of the main issue. The reason the sites were not destroyed was that the leadership of the Luftwaffe listened to very bad intelligence that led them to believe that RADAR was unimportant to the British defences.
Entirely agreed. My stance is tha the British RADAR sites could have been kept mostly out of action by a sustained bombing campaign, but that this would have been harder, and caused more casulaties to the Luftwaffe, than is sometimes assumed.


Hi,

Small piont,Eventualy the German radar operators could dectect bombers despite window because of an odd return from the rotating airscrews! demonstrated to RAF intelligence after the war had ended.

[Lightning]

Hi Ricky,

I was just browsing through the book store on our local army base when I came across "Invasion: 1940" by Derek Robinson. He points out several intereseting facts that are in line with our discussion:

The Ventnor RADAR station was attacked twice. The first time only resulted in the station being down a short time. The second attack, however, put the site out of action for 11 days. I hadn't known that, but it is a good demonstration of what bombing could do to such a target if pressed home and followed up on.

On <s>25 August 1940</s> (Edit: This should read "12 August 1940), a squadron of Bf-110s being used as bombers attacked four RADAR stations along the Channel coast. Three of the sites were knocked out of action for a relatively short time, but during that time, several raids made successful penetrations through the resulting "holes" in the RADAR coverage of the area. No follow-up attacks were made, and the stations were back on the air in somewhat short order. Again, this shows the feasibility of knocking out the sites by bombing, but it also shows the futility of not continuing the effort.

Robinson mentions the fact that the towers and wires were resistant to destruction by shrapnel, but he says nothing about the effects of blast and heat. These latter two effects of a bomb detonation are by far the most destructive, except in the case of antipersonnel fragmentation bombs which would have been entirely inappropriate in this case.

As to the importance given German RADAR by the Allies, Robinson relates how, during the preparation for the D-Day invasion, the sites all along the Channel coastal area were destroyed by concentrated air attacks. As a result, German RADAR was not a significant factor during the invasion. Had the Germans done this during the Battle of Britain (and they could have), they very possibly would have won.

Regards,
Lightning

[curmudgeon]

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

Hi Ricky,

I was just browsing through the book store on our local army base when I came across "Invasion: 1940" by Derek Robinson. He points out several intereseting facts that are in line with our discussion:

The Ventnor RADAR station was attacked twice. The first time only resulted in the station being down a short time. The second attack, however, put the site out of action for 11 days. I hadn't known that, but it is a good demonstration of what bombing could do to such a target if pressed home and followed up on.

On 25 August 1940, a squadron of Bf-110s being used as bombers attacked four RADAR stations along the Channel coast. Three of the sites were knocked out of action for a relatively short time, but during that time, several raids made successful penetrations through the resulting "holes" in the RADAR coverage of the area. No follow-up attacks were made, and the stations were back on the air in somewhat short order. Again, this shows the feasibility of knocking out the sites by bombing, but it also shows the futility of not continuing the effort.

Robinson mentions the fact that the towers and wires were resistant to destruction by shrapnel, but he says nothing about the effects of blast and heat. These latter two effects of a bomb detonation are by far the most destructive, except in the case of antipersonnel fragmentation bombs which would have been entirely inappropriate in this case.

As to the importance given German RADAR by the Allies, Robinson relates how, during the preparation for the D-Day invasion, the sites all along the Channel coastal area were destroyed by concentrated air attacks. As a result, German RADAR was not a significant factor during the invasion. Had the Germans done this during the Battle of Britain (and they could have), they very possibly would have won.

Regards,
Lightning


In 1940 German bombs were small and hence would have had little impact on pylons and wires. The dive bombers may have been able to place bombs accurately enough, but the towers were high and pulling out might have been interesting. German opinion was probably that any critical business would be being done in bunkers, not in the workmans' huts underneath the pylons.

When radar stations were taken out (or jammed) British doctrine was to use a dummy transmitter and to carry on 'as usual'. They followed the same principles in the Battle of the Atlantic, 'advising' escorts, convoys etc even when they didn't have information and also at Malta when their radar was jammed (whereupon the Germans, believing they weren't having an effect, stopped jamming).

[Ricky]

Hi Lightning - some interesting facts, thanks.

I do think that if the Luftwaffe had started a deliberate campaign against Radar sites that the RAF would pretty much be forced to start flying CAPs over them - which would lead to an entirely different campaign, and to be honest the Luftwaffe would have quite an advantage. However, the policy of transmitting fake radar signals from u/s sites (u/s in UK wartime parlance meant unservicable, which apparently lead to a few nationalistic jokes...[B)]) does seem to have convinced German Intelligence that the sites were really quite hard to knock out, and presumably not worth the effort.

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

As to the importance given German RADAR by the Allies, Robinson relates how, during the preparation for the D-Day invasion, the sites all along the Channel coastal area were destroyed by concentrated air attacks. As a result, German RADAR was not a significant factor during the invasion. I wonder if they deliberately left the RADAR sites alone until D-Day, so the Germans had not put suitable counter-measures and back-ups in place?

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

Had the Germans done this during the Battle of Britain (and they could have), they very possibly would have won.

When you say 'won', I assume you mean 'achieve more-or-less air superiority over SE England' rather than 'eradicate the RAF'.;)

[Oli]

Hi Ricky, Lightning
Re: UK radar sites
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/classic/A612334
quote:After the two successful attacks on Ventnor Chain Home Radar Station, Germany never again attacked any of Britain's radar sites, a fact which puzzled British officers for some time. The reason behind this has since been discovered.

German Intelligence assumed that no serious damage had been done to any of the radar stations that were attacked. This was based upon reports from General Martini who had continued to detect transmissions from the Ventnor area after both attacks, which they assumed meant that the station was still operational. Intelligence assumed that the radar operations room and the equipment were deep underground, and that further heavy bombing would be wasted.

No German agent during the war learnt much about the British radar system. Had they done, German Intelligence would have discovered that the power and receiving rooms were extremely vulnerable to attack, and that the raid on Ventnor had been a devastating success. It is certain that had German intelligence discovered the full effect of their attack on Ventnor, more radar stations would have been increasingly bombed, with devastating consequences.

The term U/S was officially frowned upon (subject of an order IIRC) once the US started coming over here, as was, I believe, the term airscrew (propellor was the approved term thereafter because the original word used to get funny looks from US flight crews...:D)

Also, IIRC, R V Jones in Most Secret War (well worth getting hold of, even the paperback) said that (going from memory) German radars were left alone so as not to give any warning. I think that he espoused an all or nothing camapign so as not to give away the likely landing sites, ie "you either knock out all of the German radars along the coast, or none of them". Will dig out my copy and post later in the week.

[curmudgeon]

quote:Originally posted by Oli

Hi Ricky, Lightning
Re: UK radar sites
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/classic/A612334
quote:After the two successful attacks on Ventnor Chain Home Radar Station, Germany never again attacked any of Britain's radar sites, a fact which puzzled British officers for some time. The reason behind this has since been discovered.

German Intelligence assumed that no serious damage had been done to any of the radar stations that were attacked. This was based upon reports from General Martini who had continued to detect transmissions from the Ventnor area after both attacks, which they assumed meant that the station was still operational. Intelligence assumed that the radar operations room and the equipment were deep underground, and that further heavy bombing would be wasted.

No German agent during the war learnt much about the British radar system. Had they done, German Intelligence would have discovered that the power and receiving rooms were extremely vulnerable to attack, and that the raid on Ventnor had been a devastating success. It is certain that had German intelligence discovered the full effect of their attack on Ventnor, more radar stations would have been increasingly bombed, with devastating consequences.

The term U/S was officially frowned upon (subject of an order IIRC) once the US started coming over here, as was, I believe, the term airscrew (propellor was the approved term thereafter because the original word used to get funny looks from US flight crews...:D)

Also, IIRC, R V Jones in Most Secret War (well worth getting hold of, even the paperback) said that (going from memory) German radars were left alone so as not to give any warning. I think that he espoused an all or nothing camapign so as not to give away the likely landing sites, ie "you either knock out all of the German radars along the coast, or none of them". Will dig out my copy and post later in the week.


Jones was probably the source of the Martini quote ...

In May 1944 German radar stations were attacked inside and outside the invasion zone so there was no information on where the invasion was to occur. Some stations were 'roughed up' but left running to detect the spoof invasion across the Pas de Calais.

[Lightning]

Hi Ricky,

Quoting you:
quote:However, the policy of transmitting fake radar signals from u/s sites . . . does seem to have convinced German Intelligence that the sites were really quite hard to knock out, and presumably not worth the effort.

That may very well be true, but only because the Germans didn't think they (the RADAR sites) were important to begin with.


quote:When you say 'won', I assume you mean 'achieve more-or-less air superiority over SE England' rather than 'eradicate the RAF'.

I mean they could have won the Battle of Britain. As we all know, winning a battle does not guarantee winning the war. Also, winning a battle does not require eradication of the enemy. Case in point: who won the battle of Dunkirk?

Regards,
Lightning

[DoBravery]

quote:
When radar stations were taken out (or jammed) British doctrine was to use a dummy transmitter and to carry on 'as usual'. They followed the same principles in the Battle of the Atlantic, 'advising' escorts, convoys etc even when they didn't have information and also at Malta when their radar was jammed (whereupon the Germans, believing they weren't having an effect, stopped jamming).


Let me just say that of all the Axis and Allies, I think the British really know how to fight a war when it comes to the subtle little nuances that often get overlooked. On the big battlefields everyone's strategic and calculating, but in the smaller cat and mouse games the British often out-think their opponents.

I remember reading about German night bombing in N Africa. The British rigged up lights to mimic the port and ships. When the bombers closed in, the British set off explosions so the oncoming bombers would realese also.

The Battle of River Plate-Graf Spree pocket battleship was in a nuetral port. The British tricked the crew into thinking that half the Royal Navy was waiting, so the Germans scuttled the ship.

Such little examples seem common. For the most part they seem to favor the British. Do you all agree?

[DoBravery]

Personally I think the Luftwaffe did as well as could be expected, but here are some thoughts.

1. I think had the Germans won the Battle of Britain. . .
(When I say that I mean air superiority over southern England)
At best, the Germans could have disrupted southern England as a base of operations for as long as the superiority was held. I believe the British would eventually have broken any air superiority anyway (especially with Barbarossa draining the Luftwaffe). But imagine how the allies would have had to re-think ferrying US planes/bombers and conducting the Battle of the Atlantic if Germany held a major presence in the skies over England. In the long run, it could have possibly delayed D-Day and/or the strategic bombing of Germany. Why they lost the BoB is a topic in itself.

2. Galland had another aproach to the defending Germany from strategic bombers. . .
Rather than spread itself out, he felt the Luftwaffe should mass itself at key targets. He knew the Allies had to be sensitive to bomber losses. He felt giving the Americans more horrific losses on a couple raids would be better than trying to intercept the bombers on every raid. Would such an approach made a difference to Allied decision-makers. . . Who knows?

[Lightning]

Hi curmudgeon,

Quoting you:
quote:In 1940 German bombs were small and hence would have had little impact on pylons and wires.
Two points:

(1) Eighty percent of the German bombs dropped on Britain were of the "Sprengbombe Cylindrich" (cylindrical, high-explosive) type. These were blast bombs of which 55% of their weight was high explosives. They came in the following sizes:
*50kg
*250kg
*500kg
*1000kg
*1800kg
There were also several others, but they were rarely used.

I would venture to say that most of that 80% of German bombs dropped on Britain were dropped relatively early in the war when Germany was still on the offensive. Later, they were too busy defending themselves against Allied bombing attacks against the ever-shrinking Reich.

I think that the most numerous of the bombs dropped on Britain (again, in the early part of the war--the Battle of Britain and the "Blitz") were the 250-, 500-, and 1000kg types. These were not small bombs. They could be considered small by late-war standards, but they were very destructive.

(2) Remember that not all of the British RADAR towers were 360-foot-high steel structures. Some of the transmitting, and all of the receiving towers were only 240 feet high and were made of wood! It should be obvious that the high-intensity shock wave and the tremendous heat generated by the detonation such bombs could have a devastating effect on such a wooden structure. What was not blown down would prbably have burned down.


In response to the comments put forth by several other posters suggesting that the German RADAR sites were ignored purposely until just before the D-Day invasion, that is tacit agreement that such sites could be taken out at will and in a short time with a concentrated effort.

Regards,
Lightning

[curmudgeon]

quote:Originally posted by Lightning

Hi curmudgeon,

Quoting you:
quote:In 1940 German bombs were small and hence would have had little impact on pylons and wires.
Two points:

(1) Eighty percent of the German bombs dropped on Britain were of the "Sprengbombe Cylindrich" (cylindrical, high-explosive) type. These were blast bombs of which 55% of their weight was high explosives. They came in the following sizes:
*50kg
*250kg
*500kg
*1000kg
*1800kg
There were also several others, but they were rarely used.

...
I think that the most numerous of the bombs dropped on Britain (again, in the early part of the war--the Battle of Britain and the "Blitz") were the 250-, 500-, and 1000kg types. These were not small bombs. They could be considered small by late-war standards, but they were very destructive.

(2) Remember that not all of the British RADAR towers were 360-foot-high steel structures. Some of the transmitting, and all of the receiving towers were only 240 feet high and were made of wood! It should be obvious that the high-intensity shock wave and the tremendous heat generated by the detonation such bombs could have a devastating effect on such a wooden structure. What was not blown down would prbably have burned down.


Open lattice-work structures were (and are) notoriously difficult to knock down. Even smart bombs had their problems ... which is why bridge approaches were attacked rather than bridges. One presumes the radio location towers must have been built to withstand a 60 knot wind + gusts (otherwise they would all fall over in winter). Such a structure would be very resistant to a high overpressure for a few hundredths of a second. I expect the heat pulse would have a limited range and again would not last long enough to heat the wood to spontaneous ignition temperatures (there being no flame). Wood is remarkably strong. The 1851 Exhibition hall 'The Crystal Palace' was largely build of wood painted to look like metal. And we all know about wooden aeroplanes ...

[montanamotor]

Gentlemen,

may I draw your attention to one certain detail: In his autobiography "Die Ersten und die Letzten" ("The first and the last") former german "General der Jagdflieger" (General of the fighter-force) Adolf Galland puts the attitude of the german Luftwaffe in the early days of the Battle of Britain as: "Leave the british RADAR-stations alone. The the better they see us, the more (british fighters) will come - and the easier it will be to shoot then down."

Fact is: At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, the german bomber-force was used more like bait for british fighters than for seriously knocking them out on their airfields.

The german Luftwaffe was well aware of the fact that, Bf 109 had a far too short combat radius, to reach sufficiently deep into british homeland for protecting the bombers during their raids.

Therefore, it seemed much more appropriate, to lure british fighters into combat within reach of the Bf 109-fighters (of which the germans, due to their former experiences with other country's airforces, were dead-shure to succed in!), instead of sending german bombers to destroying british fighters without protection by their own fighters.

It was simply a "If we can't go to them, make them come to us"-matter.

And therefore, the british chain-home had to be left basically unharmed, for letting the british fighter command know, where the germans would like to put up the battleground. Kind of "institutionalized hippocracy" - if you will.

And therefore, the british radar-stations went away mostly unharmed (except for some "test-bombing", more or less for research, like: Can a radar station be put out of work, anyway?)

Even the Bf 110-squadron, which raided the chain-home with some success, was a "evaluation-unit"! It was put up to research the qualities of the Bf 110 as a fighter-bomber. if you will, you may call the Bf 110-raid on the chain-home as a laboratory-test, a proof-of-concept unter close examination from the french coast!

Only later (if not, too late) the chain-home went up on the german lists of targets, when they realized, it didn't work out as they planned.

[Groggy]

quote:Originally posted by b-1

when ww2 started the luftwaffe was the best. they had the most planes best fighters and well trained pilots.the only major air powers nere them were france, russia and britan. out of wich britan had the best aricraft. know we all now the germany won airpower in france and over there lines in russia for the most part. with britan the only real air power left by the eny off 1940-41 and ruaaia in power shape how could the luftwaffe lose with victory so close?

Hi Folks,
August 24th 1939 Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill passed and given the Royal Assent all with in three hours. Provision for total war, anybody and everyone could be ordered and directed as and when the Government thought fit. All property, factories etc. were for the use of the state as and when required. People who are subjected to the first use of a novel weapon usually learn the lesson best. Germany understood the need for tanks and the British, Strategic Bombing. There are no civilians in total war. The Industrial base is as much a part of the fight as those at the frontline. Despite a stratified class hierarchy with limited mobility and 300years of Empire The UK was remarkable in having at home a society that integrated and assimilated people so there was an evolving cohesive society. . Given the Great War example of German strategic bombing the expectation of a major sustained strategic bombing offensive was thought to be very real. This acted as a social unifier and a catalyst to plan, create both a defensive shield, Radar, fighters, etc, and a strategic bomber force to respond in kind. It was the Luftwaffe’s lack of the last element and the means to sustain such an offensive either against the UK, Soviet Union or the USA and Hitler’s refusal to utilise the whole of the Third Reich’s Industrial base from the beginning that lead to the Luftwaffe’s downfall . It should not be forgotten that both the major Authoritarian European Dictatorships were seen as potential aggressors. Hence the remarkable long bombing ranges built in to RAF bomber specifications pre-war in case of an act of aggression by Stalin. This no doubt emphasised the need for large four engine bombers where as high speed two engine bombers would have been adequate and as effective in the Western European Theatre.

[Lightning]

Hi curmudgeon,

Quoting you:

quote:Open lattice-work structures were (and are) notoriously difficult to knock down. Even smart bombs had their problems ... which is why bridge approaches were attacked rather than bridges.
Many times bridges are left intact so that they can be used by the attacking force at a later time. The approaches are easily knocked out but are also easily repaired. However, if the approaches can be kept out of use for a short time, the bridge will ready for use when needed by the advancing troops e.g. the bridge at Remagen which, in spite of being damaged, was still usable to the US Army for several crucial days before it finally collapsed.

In many cases, bridges were prime targets of aerial bombing, both from high and low altitudes. When it was desired, these bridges were destroyed--even if it took multiple attacks. An examination of the destroyed bridges across the Main river at Frankfurt is a good example.

Although not a WWII film, "The Bridges of To Ko Ri" is an excellent movie dealing with this subject.

quote:One presumes the radio location towers must have been built to withstand a 60 knot wind + gusts (otherwise they would all fall over in winter). Such a structure would be very resistant to a high overpressure for a few hundredths of a second.

Consider a window pane that can take a steady hurricane-force wind but is cracked by an instataneous sonic boom of an aircraft high overhead.

quote:I expect the heat pulse would have a limited range and again would not last long enough to heat the wood to spontaneous ignition temperatures (there being no flame).

When several hundred pounds of high explosives detonates, there is a tremendous amount of raw flame. It is not as apparent when the explosion throws up a cloud of dirt and debris, but it is there. If you watch color film of a bomb blast, you'll see an angry red ball of flame in the center of the blast. If you are anywhere near such a blast you'll feel a wave of heat.

Probably worse than the injuries to bombing victims caused by blast are the horrible burns inflicted. Intense fires are also stated when there is any kind of fuel, wood included, available to support them.

Regards,
Lightning

[Lightning]

Hi montanamotor,

I think the points you bring up are quite good. They make sense and are in keeping with one of the main objectives of "The Battle" i.e. to destroy the RAF's fighter force (at least initially, before it became a matter of "revenge" raids).

As you describe, it wasn't a matter of "we can't knock out the RADAR sites" but of "we don't want to knock out the RADAR sites." The implication is that, had the Luftwaffe really wanted to destroy them, they could have.

My point is that if the Germans had really known how utterly important those sites were to their winning or losing the whole battle, they would have pressed home their attacks until those RADARs were out of action, and they would have maintained the effort to keep them that way.

I can't say it enough: Completely inept German intelligence convinced the Luftwaffe leadership (including Galland) that the British RADAR was unimportant, and the Luftwaffe leadership (including Galland) was foolish enough to believe it!

Regards,
Lightning

[Kutscha]

Galland was only a Gruppen commander during BOB. His superior, the Geshwader commander, was Maj. Gotthardt Hendrick.

[Lightning]

To my knowledge, Galland has never declared that he realized the importance of the British RADAR at the time. According to the book "Invasion: 1940" by Derek Robinson, Galland, as stated in his book, was also of the mind that the sites were not worth the considerable effort it would take to destroy them. It is obvious now that had he known their true importance, he would not have held that view.

Galland was not a rank-and-file pilot at the time. His own survival, and that of his pilots, was at stake since he was actually flying those missions. Perhaps he wasn't one of the higher-ranking Luftwaffe commanders, but he was high enough up that he would have been heard had he made it clear that the German fighters were suffering terrible losses because of the effectiveness of the British RADAR defenses.

Galland was never shy about confronting his superiors--including Goering. If he believed something was wrong, he let them know it. Why didn't he make an issue of the British RADAR? And if he did, why didn't he press the issue?

Anyway, whether Galland was or was not considered a part of Luftwaffe leadership does not change the facts of the present discussion in the slightest bit.

[b-1]

I see that some of u think the germans had no idea how good radar is. If the germans thought nothing of it then why did they bomb the sites over and over agian? Why did they use radar if they thought nothing of it.The facts are clear they had a very good idea on how importand radar was as did most countrys that could spend on it. Ether way u look at it the germans were going to lose the B.O.B.

[ChrisMcD]

I think that the point is that the Germans confused technical excellence with strategic efficiency.

In 1940 the British Radar was at a much longer wavelength and much less precise than the German equivalents. Also the Germans captured one of the first British mobile sets at Dunkerque and were less than impressed. So they did not consider British radar to be anything to worry about. Apart from anything else it was defensive and therefore not part of the Blitzkrieg concept.

It wasn't the second rate British radar that made the difference, it was the Command, Communication and Control setup of Fighter Command. It was only when General Kamhumber set up the Himmelbet system in 1943 that the Germans got to grips with running a properly integrated system and learned just what a force multiplier it could be.

What the Luftwaffe should have done was knock out the sector control centres - such as the one at Kennly. They were right on the airdromes and totaly unprotected - not very bright on someones part. But the Luftwaffe strike planners probably thought nobody would be that stupid!

[bv141]

The reason the Luftwaffe failed to live up to it's name in world war two is because it was run in all the wrong ways..mainly politically by the people at the top..it was never used as the military force it should have been..it was commandered by a vain arrogant fool who's only real considerations were making himself look good to Hitler..the real brains like Kessering,Galland..Student etc were never in a real position to do what should have been done with the Luftwaffe..of course the battering it got in The Battle of Britain put it back years in strength..by the time it had to deal with Russia it was under equipped and undermanned..remember all the time the Luftwaffe had air superiority in Western Europe and the early days of the Russian campaign it could afford to bomb and transport where it liked..as the Russian campaign deepened it was stretched to it's limits..Stalingrad was a great example..It was Goering who allowed that to happen by promising Hitler his vaunted Luftwaffe could supply the troops surrounded in the city in the depths of a horrific Russian winter..they couldn't and the results were inevitable.The other thing the Luftwaffe suffered from was in fighting at the highest levels..take the V1 programme..it was supposed to be a Luftwaffe project,but the army muscled in..so much time was wasted arguing and delaying projects that the Luftwaffe was on it's knees most of the time after 1943..it could have done a lot more if they concentrated on one or two new aircraft..i.e the Arado 234..Messerschmitt 262a..even the Blohm and Voss BV 141 and the Dornier 335 showed great promise..and of course the Horten go 229 flying wing..but in fighting and meddling all the time stopped anything really taking shape..in the end the Luftwaffe was killed by the simple means of destroying it's fuel supply..Had Albert Speer had more say in things a lot earlier it's more than certain the likes of the Me262a would have been causing havoc as a fighter a lot sooner than it did as a bomber..that was because of Hitler..in the end the Luftwaffe was ground down by interference..arguing amongst the military leaders and the final allied pounding of it's fuel supply. Adolf Galland knew the worth of the me 262a..when it was annonced it would be a bomber(After he'd test flown it)before being a fighter he nearly collapsed..the flying crews knew what to do more than the commanders telling them..but they did as they were told.One other thing..although the Luftwaffe was the biggest airforce in the world at the time of world war two a lot of it's aircraft were very near their sell by date and needed modernising..in the start of world war two a Stuka dive bomber was effecient,but as the war dragged on it became less and less effective over skies controlled by the allies..in many ways i think Hitler's war was started way too early for him to ever win it..they had the technology and brains to be light years ahead of everyone else but wasted it on petty squabbles and bloodymindedness....most of the project aircraft were dismissed out of hand by the Luftwaffe..some just because one person carried more favour..by the time the luftwaffe really needed these new wonder weapons it was far too late for them to be of any great use..and remember most were in today's terms no more than experiments pushed into use in war..any other time they would have been tested for a long time to get them perfect..and lack of materials made everything prone to fall apart and breakdown..not good when you're a few thousand feet in the air and one of the jet engines on your plane stops working and falls off..as happened with the me 262a a few times..or the Heinkel 177 that caught fire and blew up in mid air..had world war two started a few years later the luftwaffe would have been in a lot better shape and if Hitler had given a lot more freedom to people responsible for creating it..but thankfully for all of us like everything else in Nazi Germany..in the end it was stretched to it's limits in everyway and finally fell apart.

[Lightning]

Hi bv 141,

Your posting was very good but very hard to read. If I may make a suggestion, please use paragraphing to separate the various points you are making.

Other than that, I enjoyed reading your comments.

Regards,
Lightning

[montanamotor]

Hello, bv 141,

a line in your very bright lecture of "Why the Luftwaffe failed to win" suggests, that you are an elder german gentleman who has been a pilot during the Second World War, and that you were serving duty in the Luftwaffe up to flying Messerschmitt 262a yourself? That would be most interesting and impressing to me.

Can you confirm this? And if my assumptions were right, could you tell us something more about you?

I allways had great respect for those, who bore all the risk and, responsibility on their shoulders, flying and fighting a fight they very early in the War knew they couldn't win - but still, they flew and fought, anyway. For home and country.

And I think, everybody else in this community thinks exactly the same way about this matter.

Kindest regards,

Montanamotor

[sgtk495]

I am currently writing my dissitation on how the luftwaffe could have better countered the allied bombing offensive of 1942-1945 and read your article (bv 141) and found it brilliant!

If anybody has any contacts with ex-RAF, USAAF or Luftwaffe members, not just necessarily pilots or anybody that has any knowledge regarding this subject I would be most appreciative of getting in contact with them to further my research, I would do all the work and just conduct a mini interview or something and you would gain recognition in my works.

Even if your grandad/father/uncle or anybody was associated with these services during the Second World War I would be so appreciative to talk to you about getting some information off them.

Any other opinions etc from non-forces associated people as myself who are interested in this area would be brilliant too! Thanks guys!

Aaron
aaronkelly87@hotmail.co.uk

[curmudgeon]

dissertation?

Long time this thread has been resting ...

1) Radar - chain home was radio direction finding with transmitters bathing the countryside in relatively long wave radiation using the 50Hz national grid as the frequency standard (this is why the Graf Zeppelin flights in 1939 didn't recognise the transmissions as 'radar'). Transmitters were coupled with direction-finding receivers sited alongside. It was awful technically, but it worked ... and was coupled with an integrated command and control system, which was close to superb. Britain expected to be bombed and developed appropriate structures, the German higher command did not expect to be bombed.

2) wrt daylight bombing - the USAAF built up fairly quickly and had P-38s, P-47s and later P-51s. The German industry couldn't gear up and produce FW190s and Me109 variants quickly enough.

3) wrt night bombing - after a pathetic and disastrous start the RAF developed tactics for effective night bombing and the Germans failed to develop an integrated air defence in time. German airborne radar lagged well behind British and later US technology. Allegedly they also made the error of going for technically good, rather than adequate methods (the magnetron was robust, worked and wandered in frequency, but this could be allowed for). The UK used one cludged radar to direct a radar fighter, the Germans used two very precise apparatuses - one for the fighter, one for the target ... and had to reconcile the data.

4) wrt jet engines - the Germans went for axial engines, which were difficult and temperamental. The technology didn't really come together until the early 1950s. The UK had axial engines (from both Whittle and MetroVick) but developed centrifugal because they would be ready and the technology was well understood. The German engines did ~25h between replacements, the engines on Meteors did thousands of hours between repairs, let alone replacement (this came as a total shock to German technicians working on RAF stations in the late 1940s).

5) the allies had a target doctrine focussing on oil. The RAF had to abandon this doctrine in 1940, but by 1944 with technical improvements both the USAAF and the RAF were knocking over oil sources and disrupting oil transport (e.g. by mining the Danube).

6) in 1943 the German production capacity was still lazing along and was being overwhelmed by production by the US, USSR and the UK. Except for the UK, allied production couldn't be interfered with or disrupted. By 1944 when urgency hit home strategic materials were in short supply, oil was scarce, and the Luftwaffe was swamped on both eastern and western fronts and couldn't get off the canvas

Curmudgeon

[Romantic Technofreak]

Hi Aaron, and welcome here! Of course I am willing to help.

This is what I wrote last end of October on ww2aircraft.net as answer to a contributor who asked if a transfer of fighter units from the Eastern to the Western frontier after and end of hostilities between Germany and the USSR could have changed anything, followed by details of my argumentation asked by another contributor. This may put a new light on the question if a comback of the Luftwaffe from 1943 on had ever been possible. The numbers are the original quotations from the underlying dissertation.

Production numbers of daylight fighter aircraft was not the main trouble
of the Luftwaffe. In 1944, in this sector Germany caught up with USA and
UK together! As a new promotion thesis shows (Ernst Stilla: "Die
Luftwaffe im Kampf um die Luftherrschaft", University of Bonn 2005), the
Luftwaffe suffered from the following main troubles: too late rsp.
incomplete mobilization (production numbers of 1944 could be reached
earlier), lack of pilot training, lack of discipline (beginning with
Göring), too long staying of pilots in first-line action (otherwise the
high kill scores could not have been reached) and dipsomania among
pilots. The German fighter aircraft also considerably lacked production
quality (many were produced in underground factories by forced labour
under inhuman conditions).



Combat morale: "Das Umkehren wegen 'zu rauh laufenden Motors', 'wegen
Kerzenschadens' oder 'niedrigem Öldruck' war an der Tagesordung." (p.
234, quote #1314)
Meaning: "Returning because of 'engine running too rough', 'fuse defect'
or 'low oil pressure' was part of the daily agenda."

Nightlife: "Seinen Biographen vertraute Galland über seine Zeit als
Geschwaderkommodore am Kanal mit einigem Stolz an, dass seine Männer und
er regelmäßig schlechtes Wetter nutzten, um sich, wann immer möglich, in
den Bars Paris und Lilles zu vergnügen. "Die Nachtschwärmerei war zwar
mit Morgeneinsätzen nicht gut zu vereinbaren; doch die abendlichen
Ausflüge bedeuteten eine zwar kurze, aber unbezahlbare Atempause im
Kampfgeschehen."" (p. 241, quote #1355)
Meaning: "Galland confided with some pride to his biographers about his
time as group captain on the Channel coast, that he and his men on a
regular base used bad weather conditions to enjoy themselves in the
taverns of Paris and Lille. "The night owl habit was not well to
coordinate with sorties in the morning; but the trips in the evening
meant a short, but priceless breather during the events of fighting.""

Common discipline from the very start: "In einem Teilbericht der
Kommission kam der Verfasser Major Grote nach einer Dienstreise zu drei
verschiedenen Ausbildungsgeschwadern gleich zu Beginn auf die Disziplin
und das Selbstbildnis der Jagdflieger zu sprechen: "Die Flugschüler
einschließlich Offiziersanwärter sind zu gleichgültig.Sie wissen, dass
ihnen alles nachgeworfen wird. Der Anzug lässt sehr zu wünschen übrig.
Die alten Jagdfliegerallüren sind immer noch nicht beseitigt."" (p. 246
quote #1386)
Meaning: "In a contribution to the report of the commission the author,
Major Grote, who had done a duty trip to three different training
groups, started at the very beginning to tell about discipline and
self-image of the fighter pilots: The aviator students, including the
officer cadets, are too indifferent. They know they are given everything
from the cheap. Uniforms leave a lot to be desired. The old fighter
pilot airs are still not deleted.""

#1314: Steinhoff: In letzter Stunde, p. 61.
#1355: Toliver/Constable: Adolf Galland, p. 114.
#1386: Bericht über die Dienstreise Major Grotes zu J.G. 101, 3./J.G.
105, I. u. 7./J.G. 108 für den Führungsstab Ia/Ausb., Zweck:
Feststellung der tieferen Ursachen der hohen Flugzeugunfälle ohne
Feindeinwirkung, 14.9.1944, S. 1, in: BA-MA RL 2II/181, abgedruckt
weiter unten Anlage Nr. 1, S. 293-295.
Meaning: Report about the duty trip of Major Grote to J.G. 101, 3./J.G.
105, I. u. 7./J.G. 108 on the behalf of headquarter staff Ia/training,
purpose: Investigating the deeper reasons for the high rate off losses
without enemy involved.

And, and, and. Only little excerpts, as I told. I would like to add the
following:

"Günther Rall, einer der erfolgreichsten deutschen Jagdflieger, gestand
dem amerikanischen Luftfahrthistoriker McFarland, dass ihm spätestens,
als er im Mai 1944 von der Ostfront abgezogen und ohne jegliche Schulung
zum Kommandeur der II./J.G. 11 in Norddeutschland ernannt wurde, bewusst
geworden sei, dass der Luftkrieg nicht mehr gewonnen werden könne (quote
#1305) . Zum allgemeinen Mangel fähiger Verbandsführer gesellte sich
zusätzlich die langsame moralische Aushöhlung der erfahrenen Flieger,
deren realistische interne Lageeinschätzungen sich negativ auf den
anfangs hochmotivierten Nachwuchs auswirkten(quote #1306).Immer mehr
amerikanische Flieger bemerkten, dass die Zahl der deutschen
Jagdflieger, die ihr Heil in der Vermeidung von Luftkämpfen und in der
Flucht suchten, statt sich zum Kampf zu stellen, beständig stieg(quote
#1307). Warum auch immer einzelne Piloten oder Verbände Luftkämpfe
vermieden oder abbrachen, die Folge war, dass die amerikanischen
Jagdflieger, die ihren deutschen Gegnern bis dahin mit großer Vorsicht
begegnet waren, während der Abnutzungskämpfe des Frühjahrs 1944
reichlich Selbstvertrauen hinzugewannen, zunehmend angriffslustiger
agierten und die Verluste der Luftwaffe dadurch weiter anstiegen(quote
#1308 )."
Meaning: "Günter Rall, one of the most successfull German fighter
pilots, confessed to the American aviation historian McFarland, that at
the latest point of time, when in May 1944 he was wirthdrawn from the
Eastern frontier and without any preparation was appointed wing
commander of II./JG 11 in Northern Germany, he became aware that the air
war was impossible to be won any longer. To the common lack of able
formation leaders there came the slow moral undermining of the
experienced aviators, whose realistic internal assessments of the
situation badly influenced the offspring that had been highly motivated
in the beginning. More and more American aviators noticed, that the
number of German fighter pilots, who seeked their fortune in avoiding
aerial combat and escape, instead of going into fight, continuously
rose. Why ever single pilots avoided or interrupted aerial combats,
subsequently the American fighter pilots, which until then had met their
German opponents with a lot of caution, during the attrition fights of
spring 1944 gained plenty of trust in themselves and acted more and more
aggressive, what caused the losses of the Luftwaffe further to increase."

#1305 McFarland, Evolution of the American Strategic Fighter in Europe,
S. 204. Realistische Selbsteinschätzungen finden sich auch bei anderen
damaligen Jagdfliegern (=realistic self-assessments are also found
reading other fighter pilots of that time): Dickfeld, Fährte des Jägers,
p. 221; Lotze, Luftjagd über der Normandie und in der
Reichsverteidigung, p. 157f.

#1306 Lotze, Luftjagd über der Normandie und in der Reichsverteidigung,
p. 149f.; Niederschrift über Divisionskommandeur-Besprechung (=protocol
about division-commander conference) am 4.11.1943, Kriegsgeschichte
(=war history) des I. Jagdkorps, 25.10.-20.11.1943, in: BA-MA RL 8/92;
Niederschrift über Kommandeur-Besprechung am 20.11.1943,
Kriegsgeschichte des I. Jagdkorps, 25.10.-20.11.1943, in: BA-MA RL 8/92.
Die Entwicklung der individuellen Kampfmoral hing natürlich auch
unmittelbar mit der Höhe der bis dahin eingetretenen Verluste und der
wahrscheinlichen Höhe weiterer Verluste zusammen. Für den Grad des
Rückgangs, so das Ergebnis einer Studie der amerikanischen Luftwaffe,
die sich mit den deutschen und amerikanischen Erfahrungen befasst, war
jedoch nicht die Höhe der Verluste an sich entscheidend, sondern der
Kontext, in dem sie standen. Wurden die Opfer von den Beteiligten als
sinnvoll gewertet, fiel die Veränderung nur gering aus und stärkte sogar
in manchen Fällen den Kampfgeist. Fühlte sich der Einzelne allerdings,
ohne dass ein militärischer Vorteil aus seinem Verlust gewonnen würde,
geopfert, ging dessen Moral entsprechend stark zurück.
Meaning of explanation: The development of the individual combat moral
also of course was directly influenced by the number of losses already
suffered and the probable number of further losses as well. For the
degree of decrease, reading the result of a study of the American air
force, which deals with German and American experiences, not the number
of losses itself was crucial, but it's context was. If the sacrifices
were estimated as useful by the persons involved, the change turned out
little or even enforced the combat spirit in some cases. If the single
person thought he was expended without any military advantage gained by
this, his moral standards sunk correspondingly to this.

John J. Zentner, The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Moral in Combat,
CADRE Paper No. 11, Maxwell AFB 2001, p. 16f.

#1307 Vgl. (=compare) Michael O’Leary (Hrsg.), VIII Fighter Command at
War, Oxford 2000, p. 43, 68, 108.

#1308 Vernehmungsprotokoll (=interrogation protocol) von Oberstleutnant
Kogler, Geschwaderkommodore J.G. 6, durch den britischen
Nachrichtendienst (=British Intelligence Service) vom 15.3.1945.
C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.), G.G. Report, S.R.G.G. 1140, Top Secret, 1.1.1945, p.
8, in: PRO WO 208/4169. Siehe auch (=also see): Engau, Frontal durch die
Bomberpulks, p 81.Hope this may be helpful.

Regards, RT

[Nick Sumner]

RT - fascinating, one question (probably a foolish one) what does 'too late rsp' mean?

[sgtk495]

Many thanks for all the help guys. Im writing this week so will try and post when I can some of my work, of course any further information would be greatly appreciated. Awesome input already from the forum!

[gruad]

Come on the answer is surely obvious.

Germany vs USA + USSR + British Empire.

The see saw surely tilts to the right even if Hermann Goering is sat on the left.